


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Full Length Research Paper

Is there borderline in Nigeria's northeast? Multi-national joint task force and counterinsurgency operation in perspective

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Borderline as a defence line is central in countering transnational insurgency. Yet, countries in African Sub-region are lackadaisical about redefining inherited colonial borders. Primarily, the study examined the origin of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) counterinsurgency (COIN) operational mandate as well as the linkage between border, threat of insurgency and MNJTF COIN operation in Nigeria's northeastern region. It derived data from secondary sources and method of analysis adopted was content descriptive analysis; enemy-centric and population-centric COIN theories upheld this study. Interestingly, study reveals that in 1994, MNJTF was established by Nigeria to deal with insurgent from its northern borders and later expanded to include African neighbours. That in 2015, MNJTF was formally authorized under a new concept of operation to cover COIN with the mandate to: Create a safe environment in areas affected by Boko Haram activities; prevent expansion of insurgency activities and facilitate overall stabilization programme to fully restore state authority. However, study found four evidences linking the threat of insurgency to the porous/undefined nature of the shared borderland with Niger, Chad and Cameroon: (1) the overlapping pattern in community settlements on the borderland makes it difficult for MNJTF to effectively counter insurgents; (2) it favours illegal arms trafficking; (3) borderland forested area serves as shelter and factory base of the insurgents; (4) borderland ecological factor strengthens insurgent membership and operation in the terrain. Therefore, paper argues that with the present character of the shared borderland in northeastern Nigeria, countering insurgency would remain challenging. Paper recommends policy guide for effective COIN.

Key words: Arms trafficking, ecological factor, insurgency, counterinsurgency, Nigeria's northeast.

INTRODUCTION

Borderline control is essential in countering transnational insurgency, and its varying threat to humanity, territorial integrity of states as well as global peace and security. There is a growing expectation that policy makers, defence

departments and other security agencies show more concern to the nature of activities going-on around and across their borders. However, it appears that independent states are less concerned about determining

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or redefining border between them and immediate neighbours. As Onuoha (2003) puts it, border is the first line of defence against transnational terrorism and the last line of a nation's territorial integrity. Besides, Cassidy (2006) confirms that borders are often used by insurgents to 'fight the war of the flea' or guerrilla warfare. It is important note that insurgent and/or terrorist organizations, have demonstrated no respect for international and national boundaries as showcased by the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States of America (USA) World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Africa and Nigeria in particular is not exempted from this threat.

Since 2009, Nigeria has been facing the crisis of Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern region. Stroehlein (2012), Institute for the Study of Violent Group (ISVG 2012) and Copeland (2013) have confirmed that its members have not only established ties with the active militant groups in North Africa, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab but have also enjoyed training and financial support from these dreadful international terrorist organizations. Worst still, Cole et al. (2017) have testified that in 2013, USA designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Consequently, Nigeria, according to Adele (2013), was classified, along with Yemen, Iran and Pakistan as countries most affected by terrorism.

Nevertheless, the sophistications with which Boko Haram insurgents had carried out modern warfare in Nigeria's northeast cleared the doubt as to whether they are linked, trained and financially supported by other terrorist organizations. For instance, Onanuga et al. (2014) has disclosed that in spite of the different claims of having upper hand in the battle against insurgents by the Nigerian military, in May 2013, the insurgents hound away Local government chiefs, successfully closed down police stations, schools, other public offices and hoisted their flags, preaching openly in over 20 towns in Borno State. Accordingly, Onyemaizu in Obi and Akeregha (2014) confirmed that:

It took the Nigerian military by surprise as Boko Haram declared territorial gain in various Nigeria towns at the border area in the northeast including in Bama, Gamboru Ngala, Marte, Gwoza and Banki (Borno state); Michika and Madagali (Adamawa state) as well as Gujba in (Yobe state). This marked a turning point in the war, as a clear-cut battle line was drawn between the insurgents and the Nigerian Army.

Furthermore, Onanuga et al. (2014) has revealed that the insurgents were bold enough to attempt a takeover of an Army Barrack in Boma during an operation in which it also destroyed the town's police station, prison and abducted some officers. This put the territorial integrity of the country into question. As such, President Goodluck

Jonathan declared state of emergency, given the military power to root out the insurgents from their strongholds across three northeastern states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). And with this military operation, Boko Haram members fled to Nigeria borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Onanuga et al., 2014).

Though, these areas occupied by Boko Haram were reclaimed or recaptured, Strohlic (2020) have noted that 276 Government Secondary School (GSS) Girls in Chibok Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State were abducted on 14th April 2014 by the insurgents and moved into Zambisa forest at the border, while about 57 escaped on transit; 103 were released through Federal government negotiation in exchange for member of the insurgents in national prisons, 112 are yet to be rescued and some are believed to be dead. Statistics from Cascais (2019) confirmed that over ten years of Boko Haram attacks, around 32,000 people have been killed and millions displaced from their homes, a unique record among contemporary terrorist organizations. However, it is important to note that Boko Haram insurgency has transcended national boundaries as Assanvo *et al* (2016) unveiled thus:

Boko Haram insurgency originated in Nigeria's northeast but it has gradually spread to other parts of the country and to a large portion of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The scourge threatens not only Nigeria's territorial integrity but also regional stability and the security of millions of people. Hence, the concerned countries: Cameroon, Niger and Chad stepped up their military responses. These national initiatives then sparked off joint efforts that led to the establishment of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)...in order to end the scourge.

In spite of the operation of the MNJTF in the northeast, it was another surprise on 29th February 2018 that the insurgents were able to abduct 110 Nigerian female students from Government Girls Science and Technical College (GGSTC), Dapchi, in Yobe State and allegedly moved them across the borders with neighbouring African countries in the northeast (Ugoeze, 2018). Hence, the Boko Haram modern guerrilla warfare across Nigeria's northeast border area raised a vital question on the nature of border and the capability of the multinational initiative to end the menace of insurgency.

To this end, therefore, the primary aim of this study is to examine the origin of the MNJTF counterinsurgency operational mandate as well as the link between border and threat of insurgency in Nigeria's northeastern region. To achieve this, three research questions are raised: (i) what is the origin and development of the MNJTF counterinsurgency operational mandate in Nigeria's northeastern region? (ii) Is there borderline between Nigeria and her northeast African neighbouring countries? What is the nexus between border, threat of

insurgency and counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria's northeastern region?

CONCEPTUALIZING BORDERLINE, INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY (BICOIN)

Globally, there are no specific acceptable definitions for each of these concepts. However, the definitions adopted here are relevant to guide this study.

Borderline

Borderline, as Hornby (2005) puts it, is the part of surface area, a line that separates two countries, the land near this line, not clearly belonging to a group or a particular country. More interestingly, as earlier noted, Onuoha (2003) conceives border as the first line of defence and the last line of a nation's territorial integrity. And Jackson and Sorensen (2010) have reasoned that the responsibility to defend territory from internal and external threats lies in the authority of the state. However, the current threat to the authority of the state in the international scenery is largely insurgency.

Insurgency

Insurgency is the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated group that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, and the actions focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion (North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO, 2011). In the same vein, the British Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as "the actions of a minority group within a state that tend toward forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate people to accept such a change" (cited in Liolio, 2013). For Metz and Millen (2004), insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups, which cannot attain their political objectives through a quick seizure of power but often characterized by protracted, asymmetric violence, ambiguity as well as the use of complex terrain such as jungles, mountains, urban areas, psychological warfare, and political mobilization - all designed to protect the insurgents and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour. Simply put, Beck (2008) conceives insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities where the non-ruling group deliberately uses a combination of politics and violence to further its cause. However, when this happened, the state needs to take COIN measures to suppress it.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency is the opposite of insurgency

frequently refers as an acronym COIN. By definition, COIN is a combination of measures undertaken by legitimate government of a state or country to curb or suppress an insurgency taken up against it (Liolio, 2013). The U.S. COIN Guide (2009), defined COIN as a "comprehensive civilian-military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes." For Davidson (2016), it is "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency". And it requires a comprehensive assessment of the root causes, strategy and technique of the insurgents. Similarly, NATO (2011) conceived it as set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents employ varied tactics and methods. These include political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure activities (ways), in an attempt to reach a favourable outcome (ends) and within the resources available, including time (means). If this broad array is generally categorized as political and military in nature, political considerations are of much greater importance than military considerations in a struggle for the consent of the population. Anyway, this is contestable.

In comparison, Liolio (2013) notes that, while insurgents for instance try to overthrow the existing political authority in order to establish theirs, the counterinsurgent forces try to reinstate the existing political structures as well as reduce or annihilate the usurping authority of the insurgents. Hence, in this study borderline is seen as a defence line, line of demarcation between Nigeria and her northeastern African neighbours. Insurgency is viewed as the violence asymmetric strategy by Boko Haram militants aiming at gaining political authority in some states in the Nigeria's northeastern region. While, counterinsurgency is the various measures the Nigeria governments is employing in collaboration with other African neighbours to suppress the Boko Haram violence activities in the region.

ENEMY-CENTRIC AND POPULATION-CENTRIC: THEORETICAL/EMPIRICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

Paul et al. (2013) identifies two core theories of COIN: population-centric and enemy-centric. The former focuses on the population as "the sea" in which the insurgents "swim". According to Paul et al. (2013), the population-centric theorists assumed that if the population and its environment are sufficiently controlled, the insurgents will be deprived of the support they need and will wither, be exposed, or some combination thereof, bringing the insurgency to an end. Also, that if insurgents are denied access to and support from the population will be easily defeated as fish out of water. The enemy-

centric side, focuses on the insurgent and assumed that an insurgency ceases to exist when its ranks have been depleted and a sufficient number of its fighters have been killed or captured. It assumes insurgency as much more akin to conventional warfare and that the counterinsurgent's primary task should be to focus on the defeat of the enemy. Accordingly, Snyder (2008) sees population-centric view as indirect COIN or 'heart and minds', which places emphasis on government winning the support of the population through political concessions and aid. The terms 'hearts and minds' was coined by Field Marshal Gerald Templar, who served as a commander in the Malaya Emergency between 1952 and 1954. They postulated that counterinsurgent have to: (i) secure their population from insurgent coercion; (ii) provide competent, legal and responsive administration that is free from past abuse and broader in domain, scope and vigour; (iii) meet rising expectations with higher living standards. On the enemy-centric side which is direct COIN according to Snyder (2008), it assumes that fighting an insurgency operates by the same general logic as fighting a war, draw and engage the insurgents into open combat and destroying them. What Waterfall (2008) refers to as 'taking COIN to the enemy', the counterinsurgent win by 'overawing the enemy by bold initiative and resolute action, whether on the battlefield or as part of a general plan of action. It is assumed that punishing insurgents and their supporters can transfer loyalty of the population back to the government or occupying army (Snyder, 2008). However, Galula (2006) pursues that, this directs military action will work well, if the insurgent's cause has little appeal or insurgent have no good cause.

Nevertheless, Paul et al. (2013) notes that both the enemy and population-centric COIN has been criticized. The population-centric COIN has been criticized as expensive, long-term nation building that forbids troops from using their weapons. On the other hand, enemy-centric COIN has been criticized as unconstrained, scorched-earth violence, so alienating the population (and the rest of the world) that for every insurgent killed, ten new recruits step up to take his or her place. Although opponents of one view or the other might wish to believe otherwise, population-centric and enemy-centric can be pursued in tandem, with the COIN force seeking to deny insurgents the support of the population while simultaneously seeking to reduce the insurgents through decisive action.

However, the enemy and population-centric COIN underpins this study. As Onyemaizu in Obi and Akeregha (2014) wrote, Boko Haram insurgent chasing away Local Government Chiefs, hoisting their flags and declaring territorial gain in various Nigeria towns at the border area in the northeast including in Bama, Gamboru Ngala, Marte, Gwoza and Banki (Borno State); Michika and Madagali (Adamawa State) as well as Gujba in (Yobe State) with objective of establishing 'Islamic Caliphate'

justify no good cause. Hence, it follows that the MNJTF, a military alliance toward tackling the threat and spread of insurgency by the LCB countries - Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroun gives credence to the enemy-centric COIN theoretical proposition. It further gives credence to the realist theory of international relations, which according to Gold and McGlinchey (2017) assumes that States partake in international alliance or organizations only when it is in their self-interest to do so, explains why Niger, Chad, Cameroon and later Benin Republic agreed to joined the MNJTF initiated by Nigeria. It equally follows Musa (2017) observations that the MNJTF operational mandate to: stabilize the situation in the Northeastern region, through continuous deployment to robustly dislocate the insurgents, rescue civilian captives, to move Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) to camp for care as well as the present bent to counter the ideology of violence through De-radicalization, Rehabilitation and Re-integration (DRR) of repentant insurgent; the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), which covers the whole spectrum of socioeconomic development of the northeast region, all together gives credence to enemy-centric and population-centric COIN in all ramification. However, the enemy-centric COIN dominantly explains the MNJTF COIN operational stance in Northeastern region.

Empirically, there are copious scholarly contributions on COIN. However, there is a clear gap. Fundamentally, due to the scholars' areas of focus, they did not systematically addressed the questions this present study addressed which includes: What is the origin and development of the MNJTF COIN operational mandate in the Nigeria's northeast? Is there borderline between Nigeria and her northeast African neighbours? What is the nexus between border, threat of insurgency and COIN operation in the Nigeria's northeastern region? For instance, Gana et al. (2018) have investigated and analyzed the existing COIN approach of Nigeria government in combating the Boko Haram insurgent and observed that to combat the insurgency, Nigeria government in collaboration and support of foreign government have adopted numerous COIN measures but despite the consistent COIN measures, prevailing evidence suggests that the group have sustained its violence attacks unabatedly. To these authors, the repressive military action coupled with draconian laws and policies by the state created public dissension toward the COIN campaign, therefore, undermine the successes of the campaign and recommends that to effectively tackle the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria government need to shift from the enemy-centric approach to population-centric paradigm that should focus on addressing the socioeconomic factors fuelling the insurgent recruitment and support.

Accordingly, William and MacCuish (2013) have written in support of population-centric COIN paradigm, that to successfully counter Boko Haram insurgency, the

knowledge of the cultural environment is very much essential. Specifically, William and MacCuish pointed out that the first step United States of America (USA) should take in assisting Nigeria to counter Boko Haram insurgency should be to understand the existing culture and to help the government to build strong institutions that would facilitate economic development, alleviate poverty and reduce the number of disgruntled citizens in the society, who have been potential recruits for the insurgents. Secondly, that seeking USA support and engaging a large-scale military intervention may have undesired impact in the region because of the underlying suspicion of the “West”, as imperialist - a recent evidence of this perception was the reaction of several countries to the United States African Command (AFRICOM), that some opponents of AFRICOM have argued that the USA is moving toward a neo-colonialist stance and imperialist ambition. These authors concluded that without first building strong institution, deploying a large-scale force could be counterproductive to winning the hearts and minds of the population. On the contrary, Ewa (2018) acknowledged that Nigeria is presently preoccupied with multi-polar insurgency and disagreed with the population-centric view but agreed with the enemy-centric view, suggesting that to counter the insurgency, the provision of human needs should not be the central focus but the use of the military and other security agencies should be the focus of Nigeria’s counterstrategy to achieving the security of the nation. Interestingly, Eke (2017) observed a disjuncture between the policy prescription by the advocates of population centric COIN and Boko Haram’s driven objective of establishing an Islamic Caliphate and argued that whereas the implementation of socio-economic reforms can not win over potential Boko Haram recruits, dialogue nor socio-economic reforms can convince the existing Boko Haram members and leaders to stop fighting.

Form the above empirical review it is crystal clear that are convergence and divergence views on enemy-centric and population-centric COIN. Why some have holistically argued for enemy-centric, some for population-centric, some have argued for the adoption of both. Critical among all, is Eke (2017) position: that whereas the implementation of socio-economic reforms can win over potential Boko Haram recruits, neither dialogue nor socio-economic reforms can convince the existing Boko Haram members and their leaders whose primary objective is establishing Islamic Caliphate to stop fighting. However, none of the scholarly literature including that of Eke systematically addressed the nexus between border, threat of insurgency and how the status of border have made COIN operation in Nigeria's northeastern region difficult to succeed, which are addressed in this present study.

Equally, this study became crucial because despite solutions suggested in extant literature, insurgency thrived.

METHODOLOGY

Study used secondary sources including: textbooks, newspapers, magazines, journal articles, thesis, army field manuals and COIN guides written by experts and experience scholars majorly accessed or retrieved from library and electronic media. The researcher keenly read and cross confirmed information provided in these materials using comparative technique by placing them side by side. This helps the researcher grasped relevant aspects of the contents that answer the research questions. Findings are thematically and with the aid of chart as well as tables presented. Content analysis method was adopted due to the nature of the research questions and the sensitivity of the subject matter of focus (Figure 1).

Maps of study area

Map of Nigeria showing states and international boundaries are shown in Figure 2.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MNJTF COIN OPERATIONAL MANDATE IN NIGERIA'S NORTHEAST

Etymologically, Albert (2017) reveals that the MNJTF was established by Nigeria in 1994 to deal with insurgents from its northern borders but was expanded to include Chad and Niger in 1998. In 2011, existence of Boko Haram members in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries was revealed during President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Alhaji Babakura Fuggu (brother-in-law) of the late Boko Haram founder, Mohammed Yusuf to seek peace with the group. But was informed that ‘about 30 to 40% members were scattered in neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon’ (Ajani, 2011). To deal with this phenomenon, the MNJTF role was further extended in 2012 to address the escalating Boko Haram crisis. In 2013, Boko Haram group attack on towns and villages in the Lake Chad Basin region along Nigeria’s borders with Chad and Cameroon as well as in the northern provinces of Cameroon became more frequent (African Union’s Peace and Security Council, AUPSC, 2015). In 2014, at one of the meetings of AUPSC, the Council expressed full support for the establishment and deployment of the MNJTF, as an appropriate framework for effectively neutralizing the Boko Haram insurgents. In 2015, the Boko Haram overran a military base in northeastern Nigeria that was the headquarters of the MNJTF located in Baga, Borno State and some local residents were massacred, some displaced and the towns became unsecured (Assanvo et al., 2016; AUPSC, 2015). This influenced the expansion troop numbers of MNJTF, its mandate, as well as the relocation of the Headquarters from Baga to N’Djamena in Chad. Interestingly, major structural change was witnessed. The system was expanded to include Benin Republic (Albert, 2017). Equally, the mandate of MNJTF which was meant to be a direct response to the problem of cross-border crimes and arms in-flow orchestrated by illegal aliens, was also




Figure 1. Showing Nigeria's northeast border with other African countries at cradle of Lake Chad (LCB countries).
Sources: Albert (2017).




Figure 2. Map of Nigeria showing states and international boundaries.
Source: Buchanan-Clarke and Knoope (2017).

later extended to cover a new concept of operation which is COIN operations and the deployment was formally authorized by AUPSC (Mbah et al., 2017). Hence, the comprehensive ongoing MNJTF COIN mandate as specified by Assanvo et al. (2016) include to:

"create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups and facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations. Its mandate includes, among others, conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of the group's activities; conducting patrols; preventing all transfers of weapons or logistics to the group; actively searching for and freeing all abductees, including the girls kidnapped from Chibok in April 2014; and carrying out psychological actions to encourage defections within Boko Haram ranks. The MNJTF has also been tasked to undertake specific actions in the areas of intelligence, human rights, information and the media. Recognizing the complexity of its mission, three components – military, police and civilian were to be established."

In view of the above, in August 2015, the full component of national contingents was announced at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the LCBC and Benin raised the MNJTF's numbers to nearly 11,150 personnel (Figure 3).

Figure 3 shows that Nigeria has the highest percentage of personnel in MNJTF follow by Chad and Cameroon, while Niger and Benin are low in their percentage. This disparity in personnel contributed account for the fact that Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon are more affected by the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency than Niger and Benin.

Moreover, Assanvo et al. (2016) further revealed that during the second Regional Security Summit in Abuja on 14th May 2016, President Buhari announced a total number of 8,500 personnel. Regarding individual countries' contributions, several sources mention 2,450 troops from Cameroon. The decision taken during the meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Army Staff of the LCBC and Benin in Yaoundé on 1st April 2016 to seek the authorization of the Council of Ministers to increase troop numbers in Sector 1 – located in Cameroon – from 950 to 2,250 seems to support this. Chad's contribution is an estimated 3,000 troops. However, Benin Republic (in the west) was said to have recently reduced its contribution to about 200 soldiers for financial reasons but ended up deploying 150 soldiers in May 2016 for political reasons (Table 1).

Similarly, Musa (2017) categorized the COIN operations into kinetic (military approach) and non-kinetic

(non-military approach): One of the kinetic or military approach is operation '*lafiya dole*' (peace by force), this operation was carried out by MNJTF to supports the Nigerian Army to maintain pressure on Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (LCB), particularly in the Sambisa Forest through airstrikes and ground operations in order to degraded their capability. Second, is operation stabilized the situation along the borders through continuous deployment robustly dislocated the terrorists as the general situation along the borders was characterized by incessant Boko Haram insurgents attacks which led to loss of lives and property as well as displacing a part of the populace in the affected area. Third, operation rescue of civilian captives. These have led to the successful rescue of some civilians held captive by Boko Haram insurgents at the Lake Chad. A large number of civilians were rescued and moved to IDP Camp in Monguno for care. This was when Nigerians started gaining confidence on the military operation.

Turning to the non-kinetic or non-military approach, Musa (2017) unfolds that lesson from other theaters of operations shown that military operations are not the ultimate means in ending the threat posed by non-state actors. The Nigeria's soft approach seeks to counter the ideology of violence, build trust and community resilience at the grassroots. These include operation '*safe corridor*'. An initiative to encourage willing and repentant Boko Haram insurgents to surrender and embrace peace particularly in Nigeria for subsequent De-radicalization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DRR) process. Over 900 Boko Haram combatants including men and women have surrendered to the military and to undergo the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. Musa added that, efforts to strengthening bilateral and multilateral engagements with friendly countries at the sub-regional, regional, continental and global levels have led to the establishment of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), with Headquarters in Abuja by the cooperation between Nigeria and her immediate African neighbours - Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon for sharing timely intelligence for tactical operational needs MNJTF as well as the establishment of the Joint Coordination Planning Committee comprising of Nigeria, US, France and UK for sharing intelligence on the activities of Boko Haram insurgency since 2014. However, it is important to note that despite this dynamic COIN initiatives and efforts the insurgents have continue to carry out it asymmetry and guerrilla modern warfare in the area as at the time of this study.

Is there borderline between Nigeria and northeast neighbours?

Study findings shows that Nigeria shared in the northeast with neighbouring Country 1, 2 and 3 representing Chad,




Figure 3. Percentage of MNJTF personnel contributions as at 2015.
Source: created by Authors using data provided in Assanvo et al. (2016).

Cameroon and Niger republic, a total of three thousand two hundred and seventy four (3,274 sq.km) extensive borderland as presented in Table 2.

Apart from the above, study findings equally shows that out of the total number of border routes puts between 1,483 and 2,064 only eight four are legal routes approved for exchange of goods and services between Nigeria and immediate African countries, between 1,399 and 1,980 are unmanned illegal routes. However, both the legal and illegal route are used for perpetrate cross-border crimes including smuggling and transnational trafficking of arms and ammunitions, drugs, human beings and other related crime through methods or techniques often undetected as presented in Table 3.

Nexus between status of border, threat of insurgency and coin operation in Nigeria's northeastern region

Study findings showed that the undefined and porous nature of border largely favours insurgency but making COIN operation by the MNJTF difficult to achieve success in the Nigeria's northeast region. Information from Commodore Musa (2017), a coordinator of the

counterterrorism centre, Abuja that extensive borderland between Nigeria and her neighbouring African countries in northeast which stretch over thousands of kilometers constituted a major factor imposing difficulty for adequate policing and protection by the joint forces of neighbouring states as Boko Haram insurgents are aware of this, they have taken advantage it to perpetrate their devilish attack across countries in Lake Chad Basin. In view of this, study uncovered and demonstrated nexus or link between nature of border, insurgency and COIN operation in Nigeria's northeast as thematically discussed below.

Evidence of overlapping pattern in community settlements between Nigeria and neighbours, a borderless-border phenomenon advantageous to insurgents

Borderline or border is expected to be a line that separates two country and the land near this line is also expected not to belong to a particular country on both side (Hornby, 2005). Evidence showed that there are overlapping pattern in community settlements, built-up

Table 1. Evidence of COIN operations in the Nigeria's northeastern region March-July 2017.

Operation type	Aim	Area: Villages/towns	Outcome
'Lafiya Dole' (Peace by force)	To clear and neutralize BHIs in some general areas along Nigeria/ Cameroon border around Bama LGA.	Sirsya, Kote, Sigawa, Bula, Bundiye, Adeleke, Tchatile and Lanukura villages.	8 settlements were cleared; 5 BHIs were captured; 7 done of guns and 2 motorcycles recovered.
'Rawan Kada' (Crocodile operation)	To clear general area along the fringes of the Lake Chad and the area around the Nigerian-Nigerien border.	Villages along the axis: Douma, Kilewa, Damara, Abaga, Kilikali Bori, Kalibowa, Karo, Gashirgar among others.	Troops cleared 11 and recovered large cache of weapons.
'Deep Punch'	To further consolidate on troops domination of Sambisa forest by	Troops progressively cleared Modube, Yiwe, Tokumbere, Lokwansa, Angwa Lawal, Nmusa, Tuatuge and Parisu villages.	BHIs were denied freedom of action in Sambisa forest general area.
	To stop the sporadic fire in Damboa LGA	Mangusum in Damboa LGA	BHIs were successfully repelled; 2 killed and captured 64 rounds of 7.62mm cartridge material link; 1 empty magazine of AK47, a bandolier and one 36 hand grenade recovered, among others.
Other Clearance Operations	To clear a town from insurgents.	Monguno town	2 foreigners from Kolo Adam (Cameroonian) and Matta Francois Chadian) were arrested while on espionage mission in the town.
	To clear and neutralize BHI in some general areas in Maiduguri.	Outskirts of Maiduguri through Wanori and Kofi etc.	About 18 villages were cleared.
	To clear and neutralize BHI in some general areas.	Katara Gidan Dutse along Gwoza - Limankara road	8 BHIs were killed in an encounter while one was captured alive. IED factory ran by insurgents were destroyed; and 11 rounds of 7.62 mm, 6 rounds of fabricated 7.62 mm ammunitions recovered among others.
'Rescued Civilians'	To rescued civilians held hostage by BHIs.	When approaching Dikwa from Muliye and Masa villages along road Dikwa - Gulumba Gana	on the whole 19642 persons were rescued and taken to IDP Camp and 810 BHIs arrested.

Source: Attahiru (2017).

Table 2. Evidence of extensive borderland between Nigeria and neighbours in northeast region.

Country	Nigeria's African neighbours in northeast region	Borderland distance (sq.km.)
1	Cameroon	1,690
2	Chad	87
3	Niger	1,497
Total length of borderland		3,274

Source: created by cross-comparing scholarly documentations.

structures on the 87 sq.km borderland distance Nigeria shared with Chad, Cameroon and Niger republic in the northeast (Table 2). For example, Babatola (2015) empirically identifies that:

Nigeria's northeast border area with Niger Republic: Birin Kula in Bamle village with border settlements and houses partly in Niger and partly in Nigeria; Dambata and Gunel LGAs in old Kano State and Department of Zinder in Niger Republic; Nguru, Geidam and West of Kukawa Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno State of Nigeria

*and Local communities in Department of Zinder in Niger Republic. Similarly, *Nigeria's northeast border area with Chad: the Local areas of Monguno, Ngala, Bama and Gwoza of Nigeria are in Chad Republic - the Lake Chad region that borders Nigeria and her neighbours. Accordingly, *Nigeria's northeast border area with Republic of Cameroon: traditional states and communities of Adamawa (Sardauna), Mandara, the Hingi, Michika, Mubi, Fufori, Ganya, Wukati and others in old Gongola State of Nigeria and neighbouring local communities are in Cameroon; Traditional communities of Kwande in old*

Table 3. Status of the Nigeria's border at a glance.

Legality	Number of routes	Manned or unmanned	Activity	Often undetected methods used by criminals to cross border posts/routes
Legal routes	84	Manned	Exchange of goods and services.	Hiding cache of arms and ammunition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles' engines and inside bags of grains transported mostly in large number via trucks, trailers, lorries, old model pickup vans and jeeps.
Illegal routes	Between 1,399 and 1,980	Unmanned	Smuggling and transnational trafficking of arms and ammunitions, drugs, human beings and other related crime.	
Total border routes is put between 1,483 or 2,064				

Source: created by cross-comparing scholarly documentations.

Benue State and neighbouring local communities are in Cameroon.

The above made it not only difficult to distinguish territorial boundaries as nationals of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon mingled together. This undefined and borderless-border phenomenon has made the area advantageous for Boko Haram activities, while counterinsurgency remains a struggle. It becomes obvious therefore, why Metz and Millen (2004) succinctly mentioned that one of the strategy of the insurgents is the "use of complex terrain..." If there have been a proper border protection in Nigeria's northeast the insurgents would not have been able to display the kind of sophistications and urban warfare.

Evidence of border routes serving as conduit for insurgents to access and traffic illegal arms and ammunition

Many scholars confirmed and agreed on the illegality going on across Nigeria's northeast borders. For instance, Osakwe and Audu (2017) uncovered that in northeast region there are evidences of armed banditry, arms trafficking and border intrusion along Nigeria's border with Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic. Similarly, Babatola (2015) agreed that Nigeria's northeast borders has been serving as conduit for illicit transnational traffic of small arms and light weapons and drugs not only due to the porous nature, but as a result of the limited presence of security and law enforcement officials. Osimen et al. (2017) added that some cows and grains merchants in the Northeast sub-region of the country have devices means of hiding cache of arms and ammunition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles' engines and inside bags of grains mostly undetected at the border posts. The "grains" are transported in large number via trucks, trailers, lorries and old model pickup vans and jeeps with little attention given to them by security agents.

Evidence of border area serving as shelter and factory base for insurgents

Another nexus between Border, Insurgency and this time

Counterinsurgency (BICOIN) was that the Hills of Gwoza and the Sambisa Forest Reserve shelter the insurgents. Gowza Hills for example is at the northeast of the Mandara Mountains that straddle northeast Nigeria and the far north of Cameroon (Babatola, 2015). Moreover, Buchanan-Clarke and Knoope (2017) recently unfolded that despite military successes against Boko Haram, the organization remains a dangerous asymmetrical threat in both Nigeria and neighbouring states at the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). While their last significant stronghold in Sambisa forest in Borno state has been recaptured by the Nigerian military, the organization is spread diffusely across the northeast, particularly along the borders with Cameroon and Niger, into the Lake Chad region, carrying out attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. However, in February 2018, the Deputy Director, Army Public Relations, Operation Lafiya Dole Colonel Onyeama Nwachukwu announces that:

"a massive Improvised Explosive Device (IED) factory operated by insurgents in Sambisa Forest was discovered by troops on operation into the Forest..." and several terrorists affiliated to the Boko Haram sect were apprehended in Sambisa Forest and region of Lake Chad after rigorous combat and the factory was taken over by the Army who recovered 88 Gas Cylinders, one laptop computer, one 100m Ultra High-Frequency Hand-Held (UHF HH) radio and two Global Positioning System (GPS) among others (cited in Kester, 2018).

The above supported: First, Galula (2006) hypothesis about border areas usually exploited by insurgent... that by moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent. Second, Waterfall (2008) postulations that borders are not only use by insurgents as safe havens, border crossings have become one of the strategies adopted by the insurgents. The insurgents will seek to utilize other countries as safe havens especially for basing. And third, Metz and Millen (2004) position that one of the strategies of the insurgent is the "use of complex terrain..." and as long as this condition exists, internal stability will always be at risk; and cross border operations by counterinsurgent forces will be increasingly difficult. Hence, the need to have a

definite borderline in the northeast.

Evidence of how border climate change favoured insurgents by strengthening their membership and operation in the terrain was uncovered

As the climate is changing so too are the conditions within which non-state armed groups such as Boko Haram operate. Climate Change contributes to creating a fragile environment in which these groups can thrive. Scientists say the Lake Chad, the borders Nigeria and her northeast African neighbours has shrink by 95 percent over the past 50 years. They have also linked the Boko Haram insurgency to the Lake's situation (EnvironNews, 2017).

One major factor that further showed not only the nexus between nature of border and the threat of insurgency but as it affected COIN in Nigeria's northeast region, was that borderland ecological challenges favoured Boko Haram activities as it has contributed to improving the group membership and effective operations in the border terrain so far. How? Albert (2017) revealed that:

When the active 966,955 square kilometres Lake Chad hydrographic basin came under serious threat of drought due to climate change, its water body reduced from 25,000 square kilometres in 1963 to 2,000 square kilometres in 2010, and created the problems of water scarcity, environmental pollution, threats to biodiversity survival and unemployment amongst several other livelihood issues. Consequently, the massive number of the populations from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Central African Republic, Libya, Sudan and even Algeria enjoying fresh water and agricultural resources such as fisheries and pasture in the area were retrenched from their vocations around Lake Chad came to join the Boko Haram sect and they know Nigeria's borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger so well that at the initial stage of Nigeria's COIN against Boko Haram, they facilitated the use of these neighbouring countries as safe havens. This made it possible for Boko Haram members to fight in Nigeria in the daytime and run back to any of the Lake Chad Basin countries to hide in the evening.

This above revelation by Albert (2017) as regard Boko Haram insurgents having knowledge about the Nigeria's northeast border terrain with neighbours, very much agreed with Galula and Trinquier views that: the guerrilla's greatest advantage is intimate knowledge of the terrain and support from the population where he operates (cited in Waterfall, 2008).

CONCLUSION

This paper had revealed that MNJTF was established by

Nigeria in 1994 to deal with rebels from its northern borders but it has undergone structural changes including expansion to accommodate other African neighbouring countries in the northeast include Chad, Niger, Cameroon as well as Benin in the west. However, in the wake of 2015 MNJTF deployment was formally authorized by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to cover new concept of operation which is COIN operation. Its mandate under this new concept of operation include among others: to create a safe environment in the areas affected by activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups; to facilitate implementation of overall stabilization programme to fully restore State authority; to facilitate humanitarian operations; and to prevent the expansion of insurgency activities. However, study found that achieving these mandate has been problematic as borderlands/routes between Nigeria and her northeast neighbours are extensive/massive, undefined and unmanned. Hence, the nexus between the status of border and threat of insurgency in Nigeria's northeast region was revealed:

- (i) Evidence of overlapping pattern in community settlements between Nigeria and neighbours, a borderless-border phenomenon advantageous to insurgents.
- (ii) Evidence of border routes serving as conduit for insurgents' to access and traffic illegal arms and ammunition because they are unknown and unprotected by security agencies and law enforcement officials;
- (iii) Evidence of border area serving as shelter and factory base for insurgents;
- (iv) Evidence of how border climate change favoured insurgents by strengthening their membership and operation in the terrain was uncovered.

One way to win the guerrilla warfare or the war of the flea according to Lieutenant Colonel Cassidy (2006) is to deny insurgent its safe haven. But, this has been difficult due to the status of the border. It is glaring therefore, that there is urgent need to address the border challenges, if not, undefined and porous nature of the borderlands will continue to be disadvantageous to MNJTF COIN operation but advantageous for insurgency to thrive and eventually gain permanent territories in Nigeria's northeastern region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For border to stop being a challenge in Nigeria's northeast and to enhance the present MNJTF COIN operation in the area, study recommends as follows:

- (i) Presently from our findings, there is no borderline (defence line) in Nigeria's northeast. However for the ongoing overall stabilization COIN programme to fully restore state authority, and enhance economic development in order to address socioeconomic problems

including poverty, unemployment, illiteracy among others, it should be reviewed to cover border demarcations between Nigeria and her neighbours in the northeast. This will help to reduce cross-border illegality enhancing activities of Boko Haram insurgents and other criminals in the area. However, the border demarcation should be considered under the umbrella of African Union (AU) and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). This is important, to avoid conflict emanating from border incursion and unhealthy disagreements, that would have negative impact on the present MNJTF COIN operation and make insurgency to thrive. The border demarcation is expected to take care of the overlapping pattern in community settlement based on agreements to clearly separate LCB countries political structure from each other territory accordingly.

(ii) The ongoing overall stabilization COIN programme should also be reviewed to cover climate change mitigations in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) to make the area conducive for legal business to flourish; people who want to engage in legal means of livelihood can have opportunity to do so instead of aiding insurgency. The address the ecological challenges, the LCB countries should under the umbrella of AU and LCBC collaborate with National and International Donors, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as well as Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs).

(iii) Why planning to achieve the above two recommendations, there is urgent need to adequately and properly manned the northeastern illegal border routes in order for the present MNJTF to prevail strongly in the war against insurgency. Also, troops in various sectors' of operation must be conversant with the border terrain. To achieve this, selected and trusted locals or civilians in the problematic areas should be trained by professionals and experts with experience in COIN warfare to work with the MNJTF in the area since they are more familiar with the undefined border terrain, the massive illegal routes and probably may be able to identify members of the Boko Haram. They will also help to checkmate arms and ammunitions smuggling and trafficking by criminals across the massive routes.

(iv) In addition, strengthening civil-military relations would further help the MNJTF operations into the northeastern forest to discover more weapon making Boko Haram's factories in the area and destroy them accordingly.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

State, vigilantism and youth violence in Nigeria: A study of ‘Onyabo’ in Ikorodu Local Government Area of Lagos State

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Studies and institutional reports have argued that youth violence is a precursor to national insecurity in Nigeria. Contrary to youth as an agent of transformation and national development, their recurrence in violent conflicts has continued to undermine the national security of the country. Such security backlash is further conflated by the protracted Boko Haram insurgency which has ruptured the nation building, but also tugs on the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. While these phenomena have increasing implication for the country stability; youth violence across various communities in Lagos State, a megacity; the economic nerve centre of the country has further put Nigeria’s economic prosperity and security architecture in dire strait. This security deficit is the prevalence of anomie and lawlessness in Ikorodu Local Government area of Lagos State, instigated by the crisis of urbanisation, land grabbing, demographic pressure and cultism. This study examines youth violence and the failure of the Nigerian state, with focus on Onyabo Vigilante Groups (OVG), as a crucial actor in curtailing violence in Ikorodu Local Government of Lagos State. Using a qualitative method as a frame of analysis, the study argues that the lack of state capacity, resulting in unemployment, abject poverty and poor socio-condition is responsible for the widespread incidences of youth violence instigated by land grabbing and cultism in Ikorodu Local Government. The study concludes on the imperative of overhauling the security architecture of the state, to recognise vigilante groups legally and institutionally, as a complementary security outfit to the Nigerian police. More importantly, questions of poverty, unemployment and social dislocation should be put on the front burner of government developmental agenda to forestall hopelessness and frustration which are frequent condition breeding violence in Nigeria.

Key words: State, vigilante, youth violence, *Onyabo*, Ikorodu.

INTRODUCTION

One major crisis that has characterized the Nigerian state since its reconnection with democratic rule in 1999 is the problem of violent conflicts. This crisis is embedded in a sequence of structural, historical and socio-economic

issues. As Ogbeifun (2007) rightly noted, every geopolitical region of Nigeria is characterized by entrenched structures of violent conflicts, with the youths as the principal agent. For example, the youth has been at the

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centre of the restiveness, demand for resource control and environmental conflicts in the oil-producing region of the south-south. In the three geo-political zones of the old northern region, the enormous damage inflicted on different communities and peoples by the incessant outbreak of ethno-religious conflicts and disputes relating to land rights and identity issues (community squabbles between “indigenes” and “settlers”) as well as the perennial Boko Haram insurgencies have been the cursor to the damaging conflicts ravaging the Northern part of the country. In the south-east, organized crime and political turbulence have compounded the problem of societal fragmentation, promoting anarchy and lawlessness. In the south-western part of Nigeria, the youths are the principal protagonists of the majority of the ethnic and communal violence which have bedevilled the region. Indeed, conflict is gaining momentum and many states in Nigeria are suffering from the scourges of violent conflicts and disorder

The prevalence of violent conflicts, evinced by the rising wave of cult clashes and youth violence among young generations in many parts of Lagos State is suggestive of how violence is eating deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society. Contrary to the expectation that youths are the fulcrum of development and societal transformation, cultism and violence in many local communities within a particularized segment of the youth¹ raises serious concern for the already overarched and stressed security situations in many parts of the country. Youth violence is a constant phenomenon in many communities, destroying properties and loss of life. As stated by the Impact Newspaper 2017 ‘not less than 20 incidences of cult gang clashes between “Eiye” and “Aiye” confraternities had taken place between, 2011-2015’ in Ikorodu Local government, recording serious casualties and death (Impact, April 25th 2017). The increasing warfare among these groups has not only undermined the peace and stability of the community, it has also dangerously set a new mode of conflicts resulting from violence response from the vigilante group.

Providing the socio-political context in which crime appears to be increasing in Nigeria, Shearing and Kempa (2000:33) argue that ‘the time of political transition from a repressive authoritarian state to a more open democratic society is associated with high degree of crime and disorder that comes with any attempt to break with established repressive modes of policing’. While this position provides a fertile ground for the emergence of crime and democratisation of violence in Nigeria, a causal factor which clearly explains the preponderance and protracted nature of conflicts in many communities is the increasing level of poverty and unemployment in the country. These issues are the predisposing factors of conflicts especially as the quest for survival for youth not formally engaged has become sacrosanct. Indeed, the

thriving land grabbing activities in Ikorodu division; a rural-urban community of Lagos state provides a clear explanation of how youths have engaged in violent conflicts because of the quest for economic survival and primitive accumulation of wealth.

Given the rentier benefit and wealth accumulation which land grabbing activities attracts, unemployed youths are often mobilised, viewing land grabbing activities as a leeway to escaping unemployment and poverty. Indeed, it is the case that youth groups have drawn a connection between poverty, unemployment and land grabbing. The instrument of violence with these groups also provides a fertile ground through which they serve as ready-made agent of violence for ambitious politicians whose aim is to manipulate the electoral process. While it is expected that the Nigerian police which is constitutionally and institutionally mandated to ensure an orderly society should curb the activities of these groups, it has been grossly inefficient, lacking societal trust and confidence. In some cases, the Nigerian police have been accused of allowing the activities of these groups to go uncontrolled, partly because of their poor capacity or barefaced corruption characterizing the operations of the Nigerian police. Several of these youths caught in the act by the Nigerian police or arrested by vigilante group and handed over to the police have been released without prosecution.

However, youth militias and community vigilantes have cashed in on the vacuum created by the dysfunction and legitimacy crisis of government’s law enforcement agencies to ostensibly substitute in the function of law enforcement and crime control. This has given rise to the ‘Onyabo Vigilante Group’². Although there were initial apprehensions on the perception on Onyabo, their emergence at a time when the police have failed or needed support further confer legitimacy on the group. The ascendancy of Onyabo as a vigilante group was therefore seen as a ‘proactive philosophy that solves the problems that are either criminal, affects the quality of life, or increases citizens’ fear of crime’ (Okeshola and Mudiare, 2013: 134). Onyabo extra-judicial killings, intimidation and highhandedness, raise serious issues of concerns; they are however a potent force in ensuring peace and security in many communities. Given this, the study examines youth violence and the failure of the Nigerian state, with a corresponding emergence of Onyabo vigilante groups as crucial actor in stemming violence in Ikorodu Local Government of Lagos State. The paper is divided into five parts. Following the introduction part, the paper reviewed extant literature on

¹ These particularized elements include motor mechanics, carpenters, welders, vulcanizes and okada riders among others.

² Onyabo is a local vigilante group whose objective is to ensure the safety and general security of Ikorodu people and environ. Their objective is to prevent crime and security control. Initially, Onyabo started as a cultural Oro singer to stem theft and property crime under the leadership of Kamoru Bombata Oshikabala popularly known as-Baba Ruka. Their approach was to go after petty and local thieves who were in the habit of cutting window nets to gain access and steal from people’s houses.

the concepts of the state and informal policing structures. The next part discusses the ethnography of Ikorodu, to set the context for understanding factors responsible for youth violence in Ikorodu Local government. Part four examines land grabbing activities and the emergence of violence in Ikorodu, while the final part underpins the State, Onyabo and youth violence in Ikorodu. We then conclude and offer recommendations.

Research questions

General research question

(i) What accounted for the emergence of community policing in the security of life and property in Nigeria in Ikorodu Local Government.

Specific research questions

(i) Why are cult clashes and youth violence so rampant among youth population in Ikorodu Local Government Area of Lagos State?

(ii) How has the activity of the vigilante groups substituted or complemented the role of the police in securing life and property?

(iii) What are the motivations of Onyabo in controlling crime and security?

METHODOLOGY

The study adopts qualitative method and approach mainly because of the nature of the research questions developed for this study. The qualitative method entails the development of explanations for a social and political phenomenon through an analysis of a given research problem from the perspectives, values opinions, behaviours of the research participants and within the social and political context of the population, to answer a particular question' (Hancock, 2002: 2). Thus, the goal of this methodology is to answer question of 'how and why'. In other words, the study aims to investigate the emergence of Onyabo vigilante groups in the control of crime and security.

Under the qualitative methods, In-depth semi structured interviews and documentary analysis were used to source information from respondents in their social context, based on a set of open-ended questions rather than the use of standardized questions in quantitative surveys (Babbie, 2008: 336). The open-ended questions allow for qualitative analysis of the views of the respondents. As an explorative study, this method would ensure effective participation of the research subject and flexibility which allows the probing of the research participants to gain the underlying assumptions and varieties of perspectives from them. This method is then followed by the area of study, selection of sample and size; in-depth interviews and ethical issues and limitation of the study.

Area of study

The study took place in Ikorodu Local Government Area of Lagos

State. The selected areas of the study are limited to Aga, Isikalu, Obun-ale, Ladega, Jaladugbo, Solomade, Igbogbo areas within Ikorodu division where the stronghold of the cult groups and youth violence are prevalent. Notwithstanding, the study explores other areas of the community where useful data and information vital to the study were sourced.

Sample and sampling size

The sampling method used for the in-depth Interviews was quota sampling. The significance of this method is that there is no need for call-backs and time-wasting is reduced (Gilbert, 1993:76). The variables used in allocating the quota include geographical areas, gender, age and occupation/non-occupation. Two focus group discussions were organised separately with a total of 10 participants in each of the discussion. Participants comprise a broad spectrum of members of cult groups and members of the community in the local government area where the study took place. The objective was to capture a range of different perspectives on Onyabo and the causes of youth violence. Participants were thus selected from:

- (i) Youth associations,
- (ii) Cult groups [Eiye and Aiye confraternity],
- (iii) Traditional chiefs,
- (iv) Land grabbers/agents,
- (v) Onyabo vigilante group, and
- (vi) Members of the community.

The study adopted the in-depth face to face interview for its inquiry. This method is advantageous than the postal or telephoning survey, because of its higher completion rate as well as its ability to elicit more information when used by skilled interviewers (Newell, 1993: 97). Also, the high level of illiteracy in the country means that using a postal or telephonic survey in conducting an interview will exclude participant, and thus, likely to call to question the validity of the findings. During the interview a total number of 60 participants were interviewed at the rate of 10 per the areas mentioned above. The interview schedule was divided into two sections. The first section was on the descriptive profile of the respondents, while the second parts contained questions on causes of youth violence, perception of Onyabo in safety and security and the role of the state (police) in crime and security control. The interviews were written down and recorded in audio tapes with total cooperation of respondents and they were transcribed immediately. The focus group discussions were well-coordinated, and all the FGD questions were put to the respondents simply and openly, motivating respondents to relate, discuss freely and presents their experiences and views without sensitivity of apprehension.

Data analysis

After the fieldwork, thematic structures and analytical frame were developed to facilitate the sorting and grouping of evidence in a manner which provides clear organisation for the interpretation and analysis of data. Data were therefore analysed within the context of the thematic framework generated in a way which reflected the main sections of the interview schedule which was drawn up to generate cross-cutting themes and patterns from the respondents' answers to the questions. The results of these were presented in narrative and descriptive form.

Ethical consideration

Several issues arose in the course of data collection which

borders on confidentiality and anonymity. As noted by Babbie (2008: 66-77) qualitative research is more critical of ethical issues given that it 'fulfils the principles of voluntary participation, inoffensiveness to participants, anonymity and confidentiality and avoidance of deception'. As a result of this the research participants were assured that whatever information they disclose in the course of the interviews and discussions would be held in strict confidence and would not be revealed to a third party. The study guarantees the principle of anonymity, by protecting the image of the respondents. Their names were not mentioned in the study to ensure their safety. Through the consent form filled by the respondents, the research participants enjoy the liberty to opt-out of the study. While interviews and discussions were not forced on research participants, the study considers the safety of respondents concerning the ethical issues raised in this study.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptualising the state and state failure

The state, according to Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006: 28), is "the central agency in regulating citizens' conduct, setting rules and procedure and ensuring fairness in social interactions and bargaining amongst the people". As a central agency, it is a human community that successfully claims for itself the 'monopoly of the legitimate use of violence' within a given 'territory' (Weber, 1918). Buttressing Max Weber, Midgal (1988:23) conceives the state as 'organisation, which is composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state leadership that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way'.

Critical to these conceptions is that the most important characteristic of the state is a definite territory through which effective legitimate control of its areas is exercised. Not only that, but the state must also have and maintain the capacity to provide for the welfare of its public, provision that should include the protection of lives and properties. The inability of the state to provide these public goods, often predispose violence as other groups contest the security space with the state. The enduring nature of such contest, as a consequence of this, a state becomes weaker and often edge towards emasculation and failure (Akinyele, 2008; Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008; Alemika and Chukwuma, 2008).

The literature on state failure has been vigorously debated by scholars (Onapajo, Maiangwa, Uzodike and Whetho, 2012; Aloziuwun, 2012; Rotberg, 2002). The central argument of these scholars is that the erosion of state capacity is the bane of increasing violence in many transitional societies. According to Rotberg (2002:85) a failed state is the state that cannot provide political goods to her citizens. The government of such state loses 'their legitimacy, and in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation state itself becomes

illegitimate' (Rotberg, 2002: 85). A failed state therefore presupposes a demonstration of incompetence and weakness on the part of the state to promote the basic functions, needs and safety of the people (Christian, 2016). Some of the core issues responsible for state failure include but not limited to the growth of criminal violence, porous border, weak institutions, and lack of essential public goods (Rotberg, 2003). The combination of these factors explains the growing insecurity in many transitional societies, as many civilian groups not only contend with the state for the inability to provide public goods, they also fill the void left by the incapacity of the state. This is the basis upon the emergence of vigilantism in Nigeria on the need to either occupy the vacuum left by the police or complement them.

Vigilantism and informal policing

The notion of vigilantism is a typology of informal policing and it evolved in several societies as a consequence of local specificity and the quest to ensure the safety and security of the people. While vigilantism has been argued within the 'retraditionalisation thesis' (Bayart et al., 1999; Kagwanja, 2002; Ellis, 2005), which explains vigilantism as merely a return to youth power or the communal justice system; it is more of a reflection of the people's determination to safeguard themselves as a consequence of state failure than a mere glorification of social-cultural and historical trajectories. According to Baker (2002:223-224) vigilantism is a form of non-state self-help characterised by reactive, ad hoc and often violent methods of control. This violent attribute is what Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:542) referred to as 'established violence'. To them vigilantism connotes 'rowdy cowboys lynching an unfortunate horse thief; it however amounts to the establishment of violence which consists of acts or threat of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established socio-political order' (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1974:543). By this, it means vigilantism is the product of violence which they are determined to erase. Despite this inadequacy, vigilantism has filled the vacuum left as a result of the inefficiency of the state (Nigerian police). As noted by Titeca (2009:306) in his study of Massai tribe of Uganda, 'vigilantism is a means to ensure peace and security of the people, even though they also pursue their selfish interest in the process of securing the society'. Such selfish interest is the basis of the negative perception against vigilante groups.

In a study conducted by the Pretoria-based Institute of Security Studies in 2002, a major reason adduced for the rising activities of vigilante groups include 'perceived rise in crime, poor perception about the inability of the criminal justice system to respond to the needs of victims of crimes, and inadequacies of the formal police service' (Sekhonyane, 2002: 1). This argument is further reinforced by Scharf (2000) 'community-initiated policing'

which was coined as a consequence of the perceived failure of the state to provide citizens with adequate and effective protection (Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008; Akinyele, 2008; Shaw, 2002). The view that police are so weak, vulnerable and ill-equipped to fight crimes considering the dramatic transformation of many communities further explains the growth of crime (Shaw, 2002). A contextual socio-political understanding of state failure was provided by Shearings and Kempa (2000:33) when they noted that 'the time of political transition from a repressive authoritarian state to a more open democratic society is associated with a high degree of crime and disorder that comes with any attempt to break with established repressive modes of policing'.

Based on membership, methodology, ideology and communalism, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974: 548-559) identified several strands of vigilantism to include; the crime control vigilantism, social group vigilantism and regime control vigilantism, ethnic vigilantism, state-sponsored vigilantism among others. The crime control vigilantism is 'directed against individual involved in act proscribed by the formal legal system' (Momoh, 2011: 47). A group such as the *Esquadrao da Morte* (Death Squad) in Brazil and Argentina, the Afro-American Group Attack in Chicago and *Masais* groups in Uganda are under this category. *Ku Klux Klan* in the US and 'Brown Shirts' under Adolf Hitler in the 1930s are classical examples. The regime control vigilantism exists to control administrations. Under this category, vigilantism becomes so influential to the extent that they determine political leadership and often effect regime-change using organised or established violence to evoke political change. The military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 aimed at regime sustenance than the revolutionary takeover of Nasser in Egypt which is a clear example (Momoh, 2011).

The ethnic vigilantism is organised along ethnic or tribal lines and is established to defend the pedestrian or narrow interest through crime control or ethnic bigotry (Chukwuma, 2002). An example includes the Odua's People Congress (OPC) based in the Southwestern part of Nigeria. They were initially created for self-determination struggle for the Yoruba people in 1994 which were occasioned by the quest for restructuring and tension which the skewed nature of the Nigerian federalism generated. The resolution of some of those questions after the disengagement of the military and reincarnation of democracy in 1999 led to the changing role of the group. Many of them operated as a crime fighter and also contracted as community policing or vigilantism under the OPC structure (Tertsakian, 2003).

There is also the neighbourhood community vigilantism whose goal is to ensure crime and social control (Chukwuma, 2002: 11-12). Such vigilante groups are volunteer informal community policing operating under community mandate to fight crime and ensure security. This informal policing emerged as a consequence of the

desire of the community to ensure their safety and security, especially if they have been under consecutive security threats and disorderliness. The Onyabo vigilante group falls in this category of vigilantism. They evolved from the society and their operations are controlled by the traditional structure which serves as the backbone for the success of their operations. The attempt at classifying vigilantism above, are by no means exclusive; the trajectories and sometimes metamorphoses of vigilantism as an instrument of social dysfunctionality or instrument of oppression against those they swore to protect further reinforce the argument that vigilantism is a product and evolution of their agenda. This is why the government should ensure that the activities of vigilante group or community policing are supervised, providing support and legal framework that view them as a complementary force to the Nigerian police.

One major observation in the mainstream literature and extant studies of vigilantism is an obsession with the immoderations or excesses of the informal security group. Most of these studies seem to blacklist the vigilante group, without looking at their contribution to security. Given that crime has a way of fighting back, many of these studies hardly provide sufficient information that may be useful in institutionalizing why vigilante groups requires government support in crime and security control. Considering that vigilante group is fast occupying the vacuum left by the state in providing security to life and property, it is only apt that this group requires support and cooperation in complementing the formal policing (Okafor, 2007).

While it cannot be denied that some vigilante group may go beyond the limit of the law in crime control, a major gap in the literature is lack of concrete and systematic studies that show government support for vigilante groups, despite putting their life on the line to rescue the community from insecurity. This study fills the gap left by the literature to canvas the role of informal policing (Onyabo Vigilante Group) as a crucial actor in complementing the Nigerian police force in the effort to control crime and security.

History and ethnological development of Ikorodu

Ikorodu lies on a plateau, and is bounded in the south by the Lagos lagoon. In the North it is bordered with Ogun State, and further to the East with Epe division of Lagos State. Ikorodu is approximately about 36 km north of Lagos State (Asaju, 2006). Historically, Ikorodu came into existence between 1500 A.D and 1600 A.D. It was founded by the son of Akarigbo, who was said to have migrated from *Offin-Ile* in the present day Shagamu (Yusuf, 2017). Several historical accounts have it that one of the sons of Akarigbo embarked on hunting expedition which led to the discovery of a place called *Oko-Odu* (vegetable farm). As it is presently defined Oko-

Odu is the entire area called Agbele in Ikorodu, the same place where the first settlers in Ikorodu were domesticated³. While this account was acceptable as the major source to the emergence of Ikorodu, the *Ogborin* account by the people of *Itunmoja* which suggests that they were the first settlers in Ikorodu, having migrated from *Ijebu Idowa*; was much less episodic but has not undermined the generally accepted view that Oga, one of the Akarigbo son founded Ikorodu. One account has it that Oga invited his brothers *Lasunwon, Rademo, Anoko, Osonusi (alias Ogbonyari) Igmisoje, Otutubiosun, Oladepo and Sekunmade* to join him in Ikorodu and they all settled in the heart of the massive forest, with farming and hunting being their major occupation. They were later met by another set of migrants led by *Eregbouwa* (referred to as *Rebugbawa*) around 1630 A.D from the ancient royal family of Oliha in Benin. According to the oral account from Oba Salaudeen Afolabi Oyefusi; Oguntade II [the former Ayangbure of Ikorodu], 'the legendary Oga accommodated the migrant from Benin largely due to his kind hearted disposition'⁴. This foisted a cordial relationship between the Akarigbo-Oga stock and the Bini migrants.

However, this relationship culminated in the internalization of traditional hierarchy and stratification which makes Oga descendants as the number one traditional position defined by their being the first *Oloja*; now known as *Oba* till date. In the same pact, the Second-in-Command called *Olisa* was conceded to the Benin migrants. While this was happening, several other migrants' settlers joined to boost the hitherto settlement pattern in Ikorodu. As argued by Matthew Awolesi, the former Chairman, Ikorodu Local Government, the settlement patterns of Ikorodu will never be completed without mentioning migrants from other parts of Yoruba land including the *Ijesh*a people, *Egba* people and some *Ijebu* stocks among other races from the Yoruba dynasty. These migrants clustered around the nucleus of settlement called '*Itun*' in *Ijebu* dialects, otherwise known as quarters in the English language; located within the three administrative areas of Ikorodu [Aga, Ijumu and Isele]. For example, it was believed that *Itun-layeode* people in Ikorodu are migrants from Ode-Remo, whereas, *Itun-soku* quarter in Ikorodu is mainly occupied by migrants from Isokun in Shagamu. Similarly, *Ita-gbodo* people are settlers from *Oke-Gbodo* in Ogun State. In the case of *Itun-Elepe*, it was mainly occupied by migrants from *Elepe* stock in Ishagamu while *Itun-waiye* was originally the quarter of people from *Iwaye* in Ogun State; *Itun-soku* was originally migrants whose roots could be traced to Isokun quarters in Ishagamu and *Itun-ojoru* was the quarters dominated by migrants of *Egba* origin from Abeokuta⁵.

The changing phase of development in Ikorodu Local Government

The area of Lagos State called Ikorodu Local Government is a rural-urban community which is witnessing tremendous migration and rural-urban development. The development is evinced by the opening up of landmass and increasing population. As it is, Ikorodu is unofficially estimated to be about 5 million people⁶. This population constituted about one-fifth of Lagos State, deemed to be in the region of 20 million people. This is further evinced by the proximity and access to Lagos Island; the economic nerve centre of Lagos state. Indeed, Ikorodu provides the sea and land route to the island which houses the country's major economic activities, business districts and government offices. For this reason, people view Ikorodu as a major residential area where they can retire following hectic business activities on the island. Many people working on the island prefer to be domiciled in Ikorodu, using opportunity to access cheap land and built houses in Ikorodu. Estate agents have leveraged on such opportunities to acquire land for their business and easily established a housing scheme or estate in Ikorodu. This factor has largely been responsible for the increasing demand and ownership of landed properties in Ikorodu.

Although, there are other divisions like Badagry and Epe divisions, which are also rural-urban communities, and also share similar characteristics with Ikorodu, they however lack the proximity, urbanisation drive and industrial capacity which Ikorodu possesses. For Badagry, is connected by the Lagos lagoon, but boasts a gateway community to neighbouring countries. In the same vein, Epe like Badagry in terms of access to Lagos lagoon is just opening up to the island through Lekki-Ajah axis where properties are quite exorbitant. Unequivocally, Ikorodu is by far the most developed among these divisions. It is closer to the Island. As noted by Odewunmi (2006: 14) 'Ikorodu is closer to greater Lagos more than Badagry and Epe. It is also the most developed outside Lagos; its location along Lagos-Sagamu-Ibadan Express Road, sanctuary role for population spillover from Lagos and thriving family activities have helped its growth'.

Ikorodu is the largest industrial estate in West Africa, parading foremost government establishment including Nitel, Voice of Nigeria, Egbin Thermal stations, Radio Lagos, Port Authority. It also parades multinational coy like Paterson and Zochonics Plc, Nichemtex Nigeria Limited, Spintex Nigerian Limited, Lucky Fibre, Ocean Fisheries, Dangote Nig Plc among others. These industries are one of the largest employers of labour in the state.

While it can be said that Ikorodu has benefited from the population influx, it has also suffers the consequence of Lagos congestion as the spill-over effect and the serial migration no doubt opened Ikorodu to crime and

³ Interview conducted with a prominent indigene of Ikorodu in 2017

⁴ Personal Interview with late Oba Salawu Oyefusi, 2013.

⁵ Interview conducted with a former chairman of Ikorodu Local government in 2015.

⁶ Interview conducted with a prominent indigene of Ikorodu in 2017

nefarious activities. Many criminals use Ikorodu as a hideout and safe haven for their heinous activities outside Ikorodu. For example, it has been claimed that after the demolition of Ajelogo market in Mile 12 (which often used to be the hideout of criminals), the crime rate has increased in Ikorodu. The major factor adduced is that most of these criminals had relocated to Ikorodu which is deemed to be safer because of its rural nature⁷. As stated by a prominent member of a Community Development Association in Ikorodu (CDA):

We are appealing to Governor Ambode to come to our rescue. There is no day that criminals do not operate in Ikorodu especially at Igboolomu because of our proximity to the oil pipelines. All the criminals chased from other parts of Lagos State find their abode here in Ikorodu and this has increased crime rate.

No doubt criminal activities such as bunkering, pipeline vandalism, ritual killings, cultism and land grabbing have become prevalent in Ikorodu in recent time. This background offers the lens to the rising waves of crime, urbanisation, demographic pressure and conflicting land tenure system which has not only rocked the security, but has also instigated crime such as ritual killing, cultism and land grabbing among other dreadful criminalities in Ikorodu Local Government.

Land grabbing and youth violence in Ikorodu Local Government

Following the urbanisation and development, land became a valuable asset and essential commodity in Ikorodu Local Government. Families began to give attention to histories, oral traditions and ownership of lands. A major reason was the lucrateness and economic proceeds families are realising from the land because of the influx of people from different parts of the adjoining areas, including the South Western part of the country. Many people are driven by the ambition to come to Lagos State due to the economic opportunities it possesses. However, the high rents and scarcity of accommodation owing to over-bloated population of the island make many people to stay in Ikorodu for its cheap accommodation and proximity to Lagos.

Poverty, unemployment and low social economic status

The excruciating socio-economic conditions resulting from lack of employment and economic opportunities have further exacerbated the rent-seeking activities and businesses on land (Alozioenwu, 2012). This no doubt

offers an opportunity for unemployed youths and poverty-stricken young people who view land business as opportunity to solve their immediate problem and depressing condition of living. A major finding in the study is the impact of unemployment on violent conflicts. Many unemployed youths, neither working in formal employee-employer arrangements, nor occupied independent income-generating activities became vulnerable because of the thriving land businesses. Many of them left their employment in the hope of making quick money through land grabbing; including artisans (mechanic, welder, panel beater, Bike-rider, painter among others) of middle-aged, whose work has not been yielding because of the hardship and frustration imposed by the country's economic crisis. According to the Nigeria's federal government report, '80 per cent of youths are unemployed, 10 per cent of them are underemployed in 2008' (Daily Trust, 2008). In a similar vein, the chairman of the House Committee on Youth and Social Development revealed that of the over 40 million unemployed youths in the country, 23 million of them are under-employment and therefore susceptible to crime and criminal activities (Daily Trust, 2008). This situation has provided a potential 'source of discontent among youth, contributing to a sense of frustration and hopelessness and undermining their sense of social identity and recognition in the society' (Nyiayaana, 2011:20). The claim of one of the respondents suggests that not that many of these youths do not have a job, but they are vulnerable because of the social dislocation in the country. According to him:

Many of us don't have anything doing. As an example, I am not educated, because my parent cannot afford to educate me. Though, I was trained as a welder, but the absence of electricity has affected me to the extent that I cannot pay for my shop until the landlord evicted me. I have a wife, and two children which I must feed and take responsibility for them. The reality of survival is what led me to land grabbing activities to see money to feed my family. It was in the process that I was inducted into a cult group.

The factors above make it easy for land grabbers or agents to mobilise young people in the community and initiate them into cultism. Oath-taking is a major part of this initiation. The most dreaded of these cult groups are the Eiye and Aiye confraternities. According to a security respondent, 'the tactics of the land speculators or the *Ajagungbale* (land grabbers) is usually to storm villages, induce young people with money and material gifts and initiate them into cultism. Many of these initiators were former cultists during their university days. A number of them are drop-outs and could not fit into society and so needed criminal activities to survive'. Apart from cult members, some members of the Odua People's Congress (OPC) are also recruited. Those recruited are usually the disgruntled or those without character. The

⁷ Personal Interview with a CDA member in Igboolomu area of Ikorodu in 2017

involvement of many of them is often unknown to their coordinators or zones⁸. A traditional chief has traced the genesis of conflicts in Ikorodu to land grabbing when he posited that:

I can authoritatively say that the emergence of 'Ajagungbale' is the genesis of the problem of insecurity Ikorodu is facing. The emergence of the land grabbers brought about the issue of cultism. These 'Ajagungbale' usually engage the services of different cult groups on lands. By recruiting jobless youths into cultism, they created rivalry among different cult groups in the community⁹.

The government's lack of sensitivity to the plight of the masses has been the bane of youth frustration, and vulnerability to crime. Following Burton (2010)'s conception of basic human needs to include security, identity and recognition, it is argued that these needs are the drivers of human dignity and pride. Recognition and social identity are functional to self-esteem, a quality of being relevant and recognised in society (Ronald, 1990). Individual self-esteem is consequent on the ability of people to access opportunities provided by the state or the social structure, such as the family. In the absence of this, conflict becomes inevitable, because of the inexorable tendency to redress or negotiate survival where the social structure cannot provide it (Burton, 2010). The need to realize self-esteem and improvement in socio-economic survival is responsible for youths' participation in cultism and land grabbing. As argued by Oyefusi (2008: 539) in his study of youths in the Niger-Delta, factors such as poverty, unemployment, marginalisation and low education attainment predispose youths to militant and cult-related activities because of the gains derived from its socio-economic benefits (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004). In the same lens, Burton (2010) has argued that conflicts flourished in poor communities in large part of Nigeria, because of the absence of good jobs and structural economic conditions which results in declining employment opportunities, empowerment and abject poverty. Finding revealed that the vacuum created by poverty, unemployment, and low social status therefore is the entry point of youths' involvement in crime and social menace, as demonstrated by the rising wave of cultism and land grabbing activities in Ikorodu Local Government. These findings validated the question that cult clashes and youth violence were so rampant among youth population in Ikorodu Local Government Area of Lagos state because of the social dislocation resulting in the land grabbing activities as an alternative to improvement in the

social condition of the youth.

The interface between land grabbing and cultism

The idea of a land tenure system or ownership has become a major problem in many traditional communities in Lagos and Ogun states. This is so because claims of ownership or conflicting claims of ownership by different families have been the bane of conflicts in many of these communities. Those laying genuine claims to land are often referred to as Omo-Onile. Their claims of ownership are backed up by oral history and documentary evidence; Omo Onile exercises the right to sell, collect payment, compensation, rents and levies from those considered their tenants, buyers or settlers (Owoeye, 2018). Their presence is becoming more noticeable with the swift development and transformation of many rural communities in Lagos metropolis, especially that mainstream Lagos is becoming congested with housing and economic activities. In asserting authority over lands, Omo Onile regularly employs force, intimidation and deception to gain access and control over lands. Although Omo Onile are different from land grabbers, they sometimes operate like land grabbers over scarce land, frequently exacerbating tensions and widespread insecurity in the community.

Under their vantage position over lands, Omo Onile often sell the same parcel of lands to multiple buyers as well as encroaching on those acquired legitimately. Finding revealed that the pressure which these illegal activities drive on the scarce and economic value of lands and landed properties in rural-urban areas has been the basis of insecurity in communities in Lagos State. Dispute over lands often results in the invitation of land grabber or agents to fight for possession of the land. Invitation of land grabbers is driven by greed and avarice among family members laying claims to a land. According to a respondent, the emergence of Ajagungbale is caused by greed and avarice of Omonile:

The habit of selling land to more than one person is the root causes of land grabbing and violence. The same people that Kunle Ibrahim claimed sold the land to him were the same people that I purchased my lands from. You can't sell land to two people and expect them not to fight over the land. This is not good at all; families in Ikorodu should be warned and desist from doing so. The case of the Omonile is such that the Baale wants to eat more than the Olotu (the family head) and the children who are supposed to go and work want to deny their fathers of selling those lands. They want to live an expensive life, riding exotic cars, marrying many wives and spending money on Fuji musicians.

Notable land grabbing kingpins in Ikorodu division include Mr. Anifowose (aka Sir. K. Offin), Sir. K Legba and Mr. Kamoru Lamina (aka Sir. K. Oluwo). The latter has been

⁸ Personal interview conducted with a leader of Onyabo Vigilante Group in March 2018

⁹ Personal interview conducted with a prominent Ikorodu traditional chief in March 2018

alleged to be the brain behind many of the land grabbing activities and youth violence currently engulfing Ikorodu¹⁰. Land grabbers and family usually have an agreement which is principally based on knowledge of the total hectares of lands and sharing percentage. After, a surveyor has been used to determine the number of hectares of lands, agreement is frequently based on '40-60 sharing percentage. Whereas, in some cases, agreement is made that 60 per cent accrues to the family, and 40 per cent to the land grabbers. In other cases, agreement is based on ceding of some portion of lands to the land grabbers for sale as their share'¹¹. Where the land grabbers are the ones supplying the ammunitions for fighting on the land, the agreement takes 50/50 percent share. This agreement is noted to the law because they are drawn by legal experts who have the power of attorney to enforce the agreement should any of the party breach it. Drawing his own experience a land-grabbing kingpin¹² noted that 'agreement is usually based on a plot to a hectare of the land'. What this suggests is those illegal activities of land grabbing are equally legalised by legal experts who are themselves supposed to be the custodian of the law, but choose to be partly because of the economic benefits and rent-seeking accruable from the land business. Under these circumstances, land grabbers exercise high level of impunity, bearing in mind the legal and extra-legal support.

In rural communities where land grabbing activities are prevalent in Ikorodu, respondents noted that their activities have thrown a new dimension of displacement, land tenure conflicts and destruction of life and properties. Land-grabbers use sophisticated weapons and firearms such as AK 47, riffles, submachine guns, machete, spear and arrow among others to cause mayhem during land dispute¹³. As noted by a land grabber:

Fighting to take control of lands is like war. The kind of sophisticated weapons we used in fighting to take control is scary under such local land disputes. Several lives were usually lost, and lots of properties destroyed. We habitually bury the dead one below the earth surface, with their whereabouts unknown. Large casualties and injuries are also recorded in the fights. I thank God that I am still in existence, because no one's safety is guaranteed under land grabbing dispute.

The impact of such land grabbing dispute is typified by the 7 days violence in *Mowo-kekere* area of Ikorodu in

¹⁰ Personal Interview conducted with a prominent traditional chief in 2017

¹¹ Interview conducted with a notable land grabbing kingpin in 2018

¹² Kamoru Lamina (aka Sir K Oluwo) claimed to be a land/estate agent and developer, who is into hiring of equipment like tractors used for mapping, layout and clearing of lands. He is also a car dealer and Hotelier; GB Hotel, Odogunyan, a suburb of Ikorodu.

¹³ Personal interview conducted with a vigilante security leader in security in February 2018

2014, between Sir K Oluwo and *Omo Onile*. In this landmark violence, not less than 15 people died from both sides and over 50 people sustained serious injuries¹⁴. Similarly, the 15 people that died alongside 30 other casualties on the 20th April 2015 in Gberigbe area in Ikorodu have been attributed to the violence between land grabbers (Impact, 2015). The concern is that, innocent citizens are often victims of this violence, which promote anomie and disorderliness leading to intra and inter migration of people.

Finding also revealed that the violence induced land grabbing activities, also promote extortion and rent-seeking regime where landowners or buyers are forced to pay all sort of monies to avoid violence, despite paying the legitimate and required money to the family. In circumstances where another agent displaced the existing ones, all sort of levy including ratification, job card and security levy are forcefully paid to the land grabbers¹⁵. These levies are neither accounted for nor duly receipted. The co-author of this study is a victim of such extortion and had to pay to different land agents after several threats and attacks despite legitimately purchasing the land with evidence of receipt, survey plans and deeds from the family. The scenario of a respondent who legitimately bought land from the family was particularly disturbing. According to her:

I bought a plot of land in 2014 at Mowo Kekere, Ikorodu from the Ladugba family. It was duly receipted and all papers were perfected on the claim that there would not be a problem when I am ready to develop it, only for thugs linked to Sir K Oluwo to stop us from doing the foundation. They claimed that it is a stolen land. Despite presenting my documents, they told me that those that sold the land to me from the family are illegitimate; they have been sacked and that they are the new owner. I had to repurchase the land again at the cost of N350, 000 naira. After this scenario and we started work, a week after another group came again and threatened to kill us if we don't pay them. I had to cough out money. Throughout the completion of the house, I was paying all kinds of money or the other, and even the workers are not free from this ignoble extortion.

These harrowing experiences further demonstrate the high level of impunity being displayed by land grabbers to terrorise land owners, displacing them of their property and engaging in rent seeking activities. The implications of these have been responsible to the lack of economic development, as viable investments in agriculture and industrialisation cannot be cited due largely to the problems of land grabbers, who would rather see such opportunity for making money than development. This has implication for the economic development of Lagos

¹⁴ Interview conducted with a land speculator in 2017

¹⁵ The broad spectrum of respondents confirmed this statement.

State in terms of taxes and revenue which could have been accrued from such business initiatives.

The State, Onyabo and violence control in Ikorodu

The current waves of land grabbing and youth violence in Ikorodu Local government are the signpost of the failure of the state in addressing crime and insecurity in several communities in the country. Studies have also stressed the argument through a state failure theoretical lens on how inability of the government has culminated in security deficit (Onapajo and Babalola, 2018; Reno, cited in Prattens, 2008). State failure and/ or weakness are the basis of the rising impunity and the democratisation of violence in different parts of local communities in Nigeria. A state has failed or failing when it cannot deliver public needs and aspiration, which security is the central component (Rotberg, 2002). The state is required to ensure the protection of the people through effective security and provisioning of social-economic wellbeing (Milliken and Keith, 2002). The Nigerian state has the peculiarity of failings because of its perennial failure in promoting the security and welfare of the people. Its failure is not unconnected to the corruption and lack of accountability, which is why it cannot fulfil its basic security functions (Wellington, 2007). The direct consequence of government failure and its agency the police is the basis upon which several vigilante or community policing systems are emerging (Ekeh, 2010; Reno, cited in Prattens, 2008). There are several inadequacies on the part of the Nigerian Police resulting in their abysmal performance, ranging from the issues of lack of professionalism, ineptitudes. The issue of widespread corruption and practices is undeniably the greatest causative of police aiding and abetting of crimes. There are several cases of police connivance with criminals to frustrate justice, selling arms and engaging in extra-judicial killings among other shortcomings of the Nigerian police (Reno, cited in Prattens, 2008). This backdrop has provided the platform for the emergence of informal policing structure to occupy the void left by the police in terms of efficiency; the Onyabo vigilante group in Ikorodu is not an exception especially against the backdrop of security deficit orchestrated by the activities of land grabbers and cult groups. Thus, the study answered the questions by arguing that the emergence of Onyabo is the consequence of the security vacuum left by the Nigerian police in allowing crime and social menace including land grabbing and cultism to fester.

Onyabo vigilante: Establishment, membership, structure and mode of operations

As stated in the literature, the attempts at classifying vigilantism are by no means exclusive. By their trajectories they are product and evolution of their agenda. Broadly speaking, apart from Onyabo which

represents an organised form of community policing, the study discovered two other forms of community policing; the house-owners/occupant security guards and the neighbourhood watch guard¹⁶. While the latter is an initiative of individual or group of individuals for security of a place or an area, the former is a collective security outfit created by the government to watch over a community. Though they are sometimes used interchangeably, the difference is in terms of their sponsors, structure and modus operandi. The individual/group vigilante is an informal security operation commonly referred to as *Olode* in Yoruba dialect, *Mai-guard* in Hausa or even OPC. As an informal security arrangement, they are sponsored by a landlord or group of landlords or residents and are not structured under any legislation. The neighbourhood watch is a formal community watch, sponsored by the government and regulated by a legal framework enacted by the Lagos State Government in 1996 to 'complement the police through surveillance and intelligence information gathering' (Adejoh, 2014: 199). Unlike the two forms of community policing mentioned above, the Onyabo is a not for profit community policing outfit. It is neither created by an individual landlord or groups of landlords or residents nor established by the government; it is a community self-help initiative for addressing crime and security threat affecting the community. As a community policing, it is supported by the traditional rulers and the town and gown¹⁷.

Establishment, membership and training

Onyabo activities and operations started in 1992 as a community intervention to the increasing level of crime and criminal activities, such as robbery, arson, theft looting and window burglary among ravaging Ikorodu Local Government Area. This period climaxed with the early period of population increase, demographic pressure, urbanisation, property rights, land tenure systems etc in Ikorodu Local Government Area. Concerned by the spate of these criminal activities, the United Area Club, a conglomeration of club and base in Ikorodu (under the leadership of Lanre Olabinjo and Rado Pelumi as Chairman and Secretary respectively), decided to set up a security council to deal with this challenge¹⁸. The resolution of the Area Club was backed by the *Olombas*, the traditional worshipper and chieftaincy institutions. After several consultations with the gods and oath-taking, an informal vigilante community policing was formed, with the core objective of controlling crime and ensuring community security. The Onyabo security outfit has his sister organisations in other parts of the state including Epe local government

¹⁶ Interviewed conducted with a prominent security analysts in Ikorodu 2018

¹⁷ Interview conducted with the commander of Onyabo in 2017.

¹⁸ Interview conducted with the secretary of Ikorodu area club in 2017.

Table 1. Members of Onyabo Vigilante Group, Ikorodu Local Government Chapter.

S/N	Zones	Members
1	Ikorodu Central	200
2	Igbogbo	62
3	Isawo	100
4	Agura	50
5	Odogunyan	80
6	Isiu	50
7	Parafa	35
8	Ibeshe	35
9	Owode-Ibeshe	30
10	First Gate	30
11	Odonla	50
12	Eyin-Egbe	30
13	Oreta	25
14	Adamo	50
15	Ijede	50
16	Ogolonto	40
	Total	947

Source: Adapted from the Field work (2018).

where it is christened *Muwon*. It is called *Yaago* in Odogunyan, Ogijo in Ogun State. They are all part of the Onyabo vigilante groups.

In terms of membership, willing youths and able-bodied men who are fit to contribute to the operations of the group signify interest to be a member. Religion is not a serious condition, but the integrity of members is extremely crucial for mobilisation. In order to enlist the commitment of members, oaths of good character and loyalty are taken. A member of the group shared his own experience during the fieldwork,¹⁹

Once you have interest in joining the group, you are not required to pay a dime; your religion has nothing to do with your participation, but you are placed on oath of trust, confidence and traditional fortification to ensure your safety and loyalty. Before becoming a member of Onyabo, you need to be person of unquestionable character. 'We cannot use a thief to be hunting a thief'. You must be a member of the area and must not have been accused of any criminal activities; we investigate the past life of intending members and be double sure of their membership.

After the screening, their information are retrieved and documented, they are issued a uniform, an ID card with their passport photo embossed on it. An intending member must be mature, able-bodied and above 18 years of age. Interested women are expected to seek the

approval of their husbands and fathers before they can become members. New recruits are trained by retired security officials and security consultants, with a focus on community safety and security. There are about 947 members of Onyabo across Ikorodu Local Government Area (Table 1).


Structure and mode of operations

As a form of community policing, the structure of vigilante groups varies from one social context to another. Although Onyabo did not have any legal structure or legal mandate, they have a well-structured chain of command which depicts it as a viable security organisation. The status of Onyabo as a not-for-profit organisation mirrors the discernment of social-cultural and welfare organisation. In the absence of official acknowledgement by the state, its legitimacy is derived from the inefficiency of the police. The core functions of Onyabo like every other vigilante group is to safeguard life and property in their communities, gather intelligent information and complement the police in ensuring general order and stability in the community (Figure 1).

The intervention of Onyabo in crime control and security in Ikorodu

Informal security policing plays a significant role in Nigeria. Unfortunately, most research often focuses on their negative aspects, which includes highhandedness,

¹⁹ Interviewed conducted with a prominent security analysts in Ikorodu 2018.



Owutu	Isawo	Ogolonto	Parafa	Agura	First Gate	Odonla	Isiu	Adamo	Eyi Egbe	Ijede	Oreta	Ibeshe	Owode	Ikorodu	Igbogbo
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Figure 1. The Operational Structure of Onyabo in Ikorodu Local Government.

violation of human rights, extra-judicial killings rather than their positive contribution to the safety and security of the community. Their contribution to security has been very remarkable intervening against cult clashes and gang war, scuttling of the armed robbery attack and constituting a strong intelligent network through which the police can access security information. Between 2015 and 2019, Onyabo has nipped in the bud several cult clashes, and called the attention of the police to the menace of street urchins in areas like Itun-meko, Aga and Ladega in Ikorodu Local Government. Their rapid response to calls and intervention at crime spot has been the more reason for the respite in the community. These have promoted trust and confidence in Onyabo security organisation. According to one of the research respondents, Onyabo has taken the place of the police in terms of prompt intervention in crime control in the community. Although respondents express some concerns such as extra-judicial killings, claiming that Onyabo frequently uses forces and sophisticated weapons.

However, it has been argued that Onyabo initially started with whip or cane, called *Pankere* in Yoruba parlance to deal with crime perpetrators, reporting community criminals to their family to reproach them. The volatility of crimes and vigilante members being victims necessitated the need for self-defence, leading to the use of more sophisticated tools including machetes, sword, clubs, arrows and Dane or locally made guns. As stated by one of the vigilante security commanders;

Though there are cases of death during some of Onyabo operations, they are attributable to self-defence. We only apprehend in the hope that we hand over suspects to the police, we tend to defend us whenever they confront us with superior firearms. Though we do not take laws into our hands, we are sometimes confronted by the situation where we need to defend ourselves, otherwise we would be killed. Under the circumstance that our life is under threat, we try as much as possible to defend ourselves.

While the Nigerian police have also expressed misgivings about vigilante use of arms, jazz and traditional protection devise to identify suspects, the often-common allegation is that some informal security groups are quick to resort to high-handedness, showmanship and abuse of fundamental freedoms of persons arrested by them (Etannibi et al., 2018). Respondents however feel that if Onyabo is guided by a legal framework, they would be by far more efficient and trustworthy than the police. Some of the respondents prefer local dispute resolution by Onyabo than recourse to the police who they believe will be biased and unfair. Moreso, the understanding of the community terrains and local knowledge of trouble spot have made vigilante more effective in local policing and security. No doubt the broad spectrum of the respondents has approved of Onyabo as contributing to the security and safety of the community. As stated by one of the

interviewers;

The Onyabo is a good initiative, better than the initial watchman and neighbourhood guard. They confront and intervene in criminal cases. Their office is near us and we can easily give information, for them to respond to an emergency. They protect the immediate neighbourhood from criminal attacks, provide speedy safety and security service which formal police are unable to offer partly because of factors related to corruption, inefficiency and logistic.

In the same vein, some of the interviewers also endorsed the contribution of Onyabo on the ground that the Nigerian Police Force is not adequate in terms of numbers, adequate preparation and efficiency. As stated by a CDA chairman in Ikorodu area;

There was a case of armed robbery that we invited the police. They claimed that their officers were on patrol. Before they could turn up, the criminals have had a free day. There is little the police can be blamed for, in truth they are sometimes constrained by lack of logistics and preparation. On many occasions, the Onyabo has been our saviour because of their prompt response. They have been very effective in checking the activities of the dreaded cultists and other criminal activities dangerous to the community. They are truly complementing the effort of the Nigerian Police and this will go a long way in addressing crimes in our society if the government encourage them.

Reduction of crime and community safety

The perceptions of Onyabo in some quarters have not been palatable. To some, Onyabo is a Gestapo social institution of intimidation, creating fear and threats and sometimes acting outside the limits of its scope²⁰. It was opined that Onyabo usually goes against perceived opponents and have illegally exterminated many victims and innocent people during their operations²¹. This view became prevalent during the serious confrontation between the cult groups and Onyabo. It must be stressed that cult groups involved in land grabbing activities often attack themselves in town, with areas like Aga, Itun meko, Solomade, Obun Ale Ejina, Solomade, Benson and Ladega becoming hotbeds of conflicts and cult clashes. It was even more pronounced in a neighbouring town of Ikorodu, Igbogbo-Bayeiku where members of Aiye confraternity are domiciled and often launch attack from their base. These cult groups clustered around different areas in Ikorodu. Apart from Igbogbo, Solomade and Elepe Street, Aga that is deemed the base of Aiye

²⁰ Personal interview with a high-ranking member of Eiye confraternity in 2017.

²¹ Personal interview with a high-ranking member of Eiye confraternity in 2017.

confraternity in Ikorodu, areas like Isikalu Street, Ladega and Obun-ale and Ipakodo and Ijede another neighbouring community were noted as the base of Eiye confraternity. Foot soldiers of these cult groups attack their opponents, launching day and night assaults to catch them unaware. In doing this, they rely on intelligence reports. Secondary school students and unengaged youths are mobilised on espionage and intelligence purpose. This factor explains the creeping influence of cultism in and youth violence in post primary schools in Ikorodu division. The consequence has been unprecedented conflicts and violence across Ikorodu division, undermining peace and stability of the community. Economic activities are frequently suspended during periods of cult attacks due largely to the fear of arson and looting, which these cult groups frequently exploit during attacks.

The widespread insecurity which enveloped the town led to the response of the Onyabo vigilante group. The group engages the cult groups in a serious confrontational war, arresting and handing them over to the police. However, the release of arrested culprits by the police allege of collecting bribe led to the backlash leading to the attacks on Onyabo. A classic case of one Afeez Oseni (aka Geleti) an Onyabo coordinator; who was gruesomely murdered at Aga where he was playing draft by gunmen suspected to be cultist, was suggestive of the backlash of fighting crime. Although, some respondents claimed that members of Onyabo vigilante group often compromises, collecting bribe from culprits (especially cult boys and internet fraudsters who are members or backers of these groups), instead of handing them to the police²². From this perspective, Geleti's death was the result of the betrayer of the Aiye group, whose member was handed to the police while releasing those of Eiye because of bribe. There has been another perception which claimed that Geleti was a very reliable Onyabo officer, going by the assessment of a prominent politician after his demise:

As I speak with you, we fear the worst. Onyabo men may decide to go after these cultists. These cultists have made life unbearable for us in Ikorodu and it is these Vigilante men like Geleti that has been helping to ensure sanity around here. His death is a sad development.

The several unsuccessful attempts made on the life of several Onyabo leaders, particularly, Mr. Lanre Olabinjo, the Provost Marshal of Onyabo and Mr Lekan Pelumi (Aka Rado), the Secretary of area base further suggest that crime also fight back. One would wonder the motivation of Onyabo, despite lack of support from the government. As stated by a respondent member of Onyabo; 'our motivation was borne out of the

consequence of local specificity and the determination to ensure safety and security of the community'. Such motivation is the product of prestige and goodwill than monetary gain. Such goodwill is derived from the Yoruba race principle of 'Omoluabi'; a well-groomed responsible and patriotic community citizen.

Findings revealed Onyabo have played a tremendous role in crime control and community safety. Despite the backlash and in the absence of police response, Onyabo has confronted the cult groups and ensuring that their menace is brought to the barest minimum. They often identify black spots where criminals are based and join hands with the police to arrests criminals. The constant presence of Onyabo on the street of Ikorodu had stemmed crime, especially armed robbery. It should be recalled that before the advent of Onyabo, Ikorodu has been a haven of nefarious activities owing to the prevalence of land grabbing, bunkering and cultism. Through their corrective measure and interventions, crime has reduced and Ikorodu division has become safer (Authors' Field Research).

Complementing the formal police in crime reduction and control

Although, it has been alleged that there is a sore relationship between the Nigerian police and vigilante organisation because of the belief that they are not trained or legitimised. Perhaps, they are viewed from taking over their lawful duties (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2018). In the case of Onyabo, the severance in the relationship is the unprofessional attitude of the Nigerian police and their inefficiency. Despite efforts demonstrated by Onyabo to arrest criminal and hand them over to the police, law enforcement agency habitually collects bribe and released these criminals²³. A case of an Aiye cult member who was handed over to the police for prosecution after he was apprehended with a dangerous firearm was a classic example. The arrested cultist was released by the police, only for the boy to come back and threatens to kill an Onyabo Commander. There is an argument in some quarters that the cultism was responsible for the killing of Geleti, an Onyabo security coordinator. According to the Provost Marshal of Onyabo, 'the act where police release criminal without prosecution, has been frustrating the effort of Onyabo in curbing crime and ensuring the security of the people in the neighbourhood'. This notwithstanding, findings revealed there is a cordial relationship between Onyabo and police in curbing crimes and insecurity in Ikorodu. Onyabo and police have conducted several raids and arrested many criminals, foiling cult's strikes several times. This finding is in line with a study which noted that the effective partnership between vigilante and Nigerian police have drastically reduced crime rates in many local

²² Personal interview with a high-ranking member of Eiye confraternity in 2017.

²³ Personal interview with a community social-cultural activist in 2017.

communities (Adegbusi, 2009). A respondent in Area N ljede, had claimed that Onyabo has helped halt crime in Ikorodu. According to him,

'Onyabo Vigilante group has been quite useful in complementing community policing; apart from alerting us whenever there are security issues, they also participate in combing areas that requires local knowledge'.

This has helped us to answer the question the activities of the Onyabo vigilante group has complemented the role of the police in securing life and property. With a total of 974 members of the Onyabo vigilante group in Ikorodu Local Government Area, the strength of the Nigerian police is enhanced in crime control, especially that the statutory 29,122 police force of Lagos is inadequate in manning 20 million population of Lagos state.

Peace talks and conflict resolutions

In their bid to stem youth violence and crime, Onyabo has also curtailed the menace of cultism. It should be recalled that the activities of cult groups have constituted a danger to the people of Ikorodu and its various neighbourhoods. As a consequence of this, Onyabo has taken a bold step in ensuring that cultism is put in check. This has been accomplished through many programmes including peace talks, renunciation, demobilisation and reintegration of youth into the society. In terms of peace talks, various conflicting cult groups and other serial organisations in disputes have been engaged in meaningful discussion under the involvement and supervision of Divisional Police Officer (DPO), traditional rulers and eminent personality in the community. As stated by the provost marshal of Onyabo, 'we have organised about three peace talks between the Eiye, Buccaneers and Aiye cult groups. The essence of this talk is to settle the rift among cult groups and ensure we know them in case of relapse in talks and agreement, we then know who to hold responsible'²⁴. This process usually involves a traditional measure of oath taking to scare parties in dispute from returning to conflicts. According to the provost marshal, 'Twice or thrice in the past, we have organised peace talks between the Eiye and Aiye cult groups. This meeting is usually to know them and at the same time encourage them to drop their sword and embrace peace'. Through this kind of initiative, Onyabo has become the frontline organisation in conflict resolutions and peaceful coexistence among groups.

Renunciation, demobilisation and reintegration of cult groups

Membership of cult groups and other deadly youth

organisations are also encouraged to renounce their membership. Several numbers of cult groups have been suffering from traumatic stress and depression due to fear of their activities in the past. They needed support to overcome this phase in their life. As a result, Onyabo uses the opportunity to offer support by advising and offering safety in case of backlash from their members or society during and after the process. The intervention of the government and other relevant stakeholders are seeking to ensure the renunciation is a success. Several cultists have renounced their membership. The first phase of demobilisation is renunciations. By demobilisation many of these cultist and land grabbers have been motivated to drop their guns and ammunition. As soon as they do, a process of their reintegration is also facilitated by the Onyabo, by encouraging the government (local and state) and other key stakeholders in promoting the reintegration through empowerment opportunities, job creation, and education among other opportunities that can fully ward them off crime. The praxis of financing the reintegration programmes and empowerment often faces challenges, because the bulk of the support is gotten from the politicians who are themselves using cultists as a foot soldier during the electoral process. The Nigerian state has reinvented itself as the arena of violence institution for the expropriation of economic values and personal aggrandizement (Mabogunje, 1990). Under such circumstances, cult groups have become a force, using violence to attain the political goals for politicians (Nyiayaana, 2011). A notable politician was responsible for the death of three cult members, where cultist clashed at a convergence aimed at sharing patronage and empowerment to his allies after his electoral victory²⁵. Thus, the success of the reintegration process relies on an independent source of funding, laced with in-depth government commitment to the issue of national security.

Collaboration in the prohibition of land grabbing activities

The Onyabo Vigilante group has also collaborated with stakeholders and the State House of Assembly to outlaw land grabbing activities which have been the bane of increasing violence in Ikorodu. Apart from the fact that Onyabo has declared war against land agents, responsible for growing cult activities and youth violence in Ikorodu, they have also influenced some members of the State House of Assembly to sponsor bill against land grabbing activities. Through constant pressure and petitions against land grabbing kingpins, particularly Sir K Oluwo, the Lagos State Government signed the Lagos State Properties Protection Bill on August 2016. The bill was sponsored by Hon. Sanai Agunbiade and Hon. Bayo Osinowo; it prohibits land grabbing and recommends stiff

²⁴ Personal interview with prominent leader of Onyabo in 2017.

²⁵ Personal interview with prominent leader of Onyabo in 2017.

penalties for infringement. According to the law 'forcibly entry and occupation of landed properties, violence and fraudulent conducts concerning landed properties, armed robbery, kidnapping, cultism and allied matters incidental thereto', shall be prosecuted. The bill has a taskforce component which is mandated to implement the land grabbing law. The taskforce follows four phases before activating the law. Parties to the land conflict are engaged in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) based on the evidence presented by them. Where unsatisfied, the taskforce graduates to the second phase, which is the on-site inspection for geographical evidence. Where the decision is not acceptable to the parties, the case is taken to court as the third phase, and court verdict is enforced by the relevant government agencies as the final phase (Owoeye, 2018). Empirical evidence collected through fieldwork in different parts of Ikorodu local government areas where the fieldwork takes place, particularly Mowo-Kerere, Gberigbe, Mowo-nla, Gbaga, Bagidan, Oko-Ito, demonstrated that the task force has been able to curtail the menace of land grabbing. Many of the land grabbers and agents have been arrested, charged to the court of competent jurisdiction. A noteworthy one is the incarceration of Kamoru Lamina; aka Sir K Oluwo and his gangs for 6 months and subsequently charged on a five-count charges, which include forceful and illegal possession of the land, fraudulent claim to the progeny of Ifegbuwa family to seize land in Ikorodu, unleashing of violence, cultism and stealing (Owoeye, 2018). Most of the Onyabo, traditional rulers, land buyers and even some of the cult groups were satisfied with the steps taken by the government. This further explained reduction in the activities of land grabbers.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

While the failure of the Nigerian state in addressing unemployment and poverty has been responsible for the increasing rate of youth violence and cultism in Ikorodu Local Government of Lagos State, the security deficit in the area is further reinforced by the crisis of land grabbing, demographic pressures, urbanisation and conflicts of the land tenure system and ownership. The intervention of Onyabo, as a viable informal community policing has been remarkable in stemming crime through its security intervention and support to the Nigeria police in ensuring orderliness, but also through some noteworthy initiatives including, renunciation, demobilisation and reintegration of cult groups, peace talk and conflicts resolution among serial violent groups in the community. This idea is geared towards eradication of violence in Ikorodu local government. Despite their tendency to deploy extra-judicial means, it has been argued that where there are legal framework and

financial support, those inadequacies could be addressed. Indeed, the significance of Onyabo as a potent and complementing social institution to the Nigerian police in ensuring crime and violence-free society cannot be overemphasised. The Lagos State government land grabbing law which seeks to prohibit all sources of illegal land acquisition, violence and cultism have a great impact promoting peaceful environment devoid of violence and insecurity. While, the failure of the state is largely responsible to the resurgence of crime, more research is needed on the dynamics and survival of cultism in many communities in Lagos states, Nigeria, despite government effort in halting it.

There is therefore the need to organise a formal training and reorientation programme to equip Onyabo with contemporary security skills and tactics concerning crime control. Most times the challenge has always been that vigilante groups are not properly schooled in the proper knowledge of crime control, explaining their overzealousness, highhandedness and human rights abuse. Also, there should be an overhaul of the security architecture of the Nigerian police, by reviewing their philosophy, orientations, operations and logistics requirements. Most times, the Nigerian police suffer from porous structure and inadequate logistics which often result in their inefficiency. The relationship between the police and Vigilante groups (Onyabo) should be redefined through a legislation that defines their collaboration or long term partnership agreement on the principles of cooperation. In addition, Besides, the Nigerian state should strengthen its capacity, to promote viable institutions which address poverty and unemployment. More importantly, vigilante group should be made accountable to the community and a reward system be instituted by their recognition which could be in form of salary and compensation.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Review

Black-and-white picture of a political system: Post-apartheid South Africa

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This article analyzes the cultural and political changes that occurred in South Africa after the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994. Such relevant events have impacted South African political system; it is defined by Almond and Verba as the interaction of rôles (differentiated and undifferentiated) and the political culture (heterogeneous and homogeneous) in a country. A change in one of the two components is likely to trigger a change in the other, as well as a shift of the system in the four-fold Almond's classification. The descriptive statistics and comparative document analysis employed to analyze data from 1982 and 2013 highlighted changes in both the political culture and the structure of rôles' interactions, as well as a consequent shift of the political system from a Pre-industrialized/Totalitarian to a Continental European one.

Key words: Apartheid, political system, rôles, political culture, comparative analysis.

INTRODUCTION

After 46 years of segregation regime and 4 years of hard and at times stagnant negotiations (Byrnes, 1996b), in 1994 South Africa experienced its first free elections. This event was a milestone in the social and political history of South Africa: As the lawful racial segregation ceased, portions of population came to enjoy the right to vote for the very first time, participating in the shaping of the new political system that emerged with the election of Nelson Mandela as President. This is a clear manifestation of what Almond called "a political culture of participation" (Almond et al., 2008a: 2-3), being political culture broadly defined as people's cognition, values and affective commitments towards the polity, policies and politics (Almond, 2000: 9).

It is clear that such a cry for change came from an urgent, pressuring and feeling of inappropriateness of the political system with regards to the political culture. However, the great socio-political change came with costs: Violent and rageous riots were held in Soweto and other South African townships, with many casualties on both sides. Such a pivotal event in the history of a country and its people is likely to affect not only the future political structure, but also how citizens see the political system and relate themselves to it – namely, the political culture itself (Almond et al., 2008a, b). Moreover, after Mandela's election, a process of Constitutional reform was undertaken, resulting in South Africa's 1996 Constitution. It ushered in a democratic regime that

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brought new freedoms and rights and greatly expanded for political participation (Byrnes, 1996b).

South African political culture and structure changed drastically during the 1990s (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1987). These two aspects are the two fundamental components of a political system as analyzed by Almond in 1956. Almond's fourfold classification of political systems is built upon the binary nature of these two dimensions (Almond, 1956). A change in one of the two would therefore make the respective political system shift, or relocate into another class. In the specific, South Africa went through a process of change of not one, but both the dimensions of the classification. Did the political system shift as well according to Almond's classification?

While this step is of uttermost importance and well stressed in Almond (1956, 1965, 1989, 2000) work, most of his studies focus on modernized and industrialized countries, with variation on Asian or communist countries (*ibid.*). The only African exception is made for Nigeria, included in his famous masterpiece study of political attitudes and democracy in five nations (Almond and Verba, 1963, ed. 1989). The African continent, center of the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) for the dramatic political processes of decolonization and political transformation in the last decade of the XIX century, has been left underexplored. This article aims at testing whether the constitutional and social pivotal changes led to a shift of the South African political system. To pursue this aim, a mixed design of quantitative and qualitative methods was used in order to analyze the two aspects – political culture and political structure – in pre- and post- 1994 South Africa. In fact, while the literature agrees that political cultures indeed change (Almond, 1956, 2000; Almond and Verba, 1989; Almond et al., 2008a, b; Silver and Dowley, 2000; Ross, 2000; Pateman, 1971), it is also agreed that norms typically change slowly and reflect stable values. Political cultures are sustained or changed as people acquire their attitudes and values (Almond et al., 2008a). Therefore, the variation of South African political culture homogeneity is measured by analyzing two dataset of the World Values Survey, the “first wave” (1982) and the “sixth wave” (2013). By comparing these two moments in time, the differences (if any) will be captured between the political culture of two generations of South African, what Mattes defined the “Grand Apartheid Generation” and the “Born Frees” (Mattes, 2012: 137-140). With regard to the analysis of the change in the political structure, the study will compare the two Constitutions of 1983 – known as the Tricameral Constitution, or ACT 10- and of 1996, drafted during Mandela's early office by the Constitutional Assembly, consisting of the combined Senate and National Assembly (Byrnes, 1996b).

The article is composed of four parts structured as follows: First, a literature review that covers scholars' opinion and studies of South Africa transition after 1994; bearing in mind that the research does not focus on

democratic features of the new political system, but rather on changes in its two dimensions and the consequent shift of the system itself in the iconic fourfold classification (Byrnes, 1996b); the theoretical framework will clarify and outline the major components of the political systems, their definitions and the links that tie them together so closely. Here, the methodology will also be further clarified to analyze the political culture and the political structure; the third part will focus on an extensive analysis of data and results; the last section is left for the discussion of the findings and the conclusion.

HOW DID IT ALL START: SHORT HISTORY OF THE APARTHEID FALL

Apartheid lasted for 46 years, from 1948 to 1994. The tyranny of the white minority over the other ethnicities started to falter when President F.W. De Klerk recognized the urgent need to bring the black majority of South Africans into the political process, after the pressures of the violent protests and the isolation from the international community became unbearable for the developing country, and most NP moderates agreed with him in principle (Byrnes, 1996a, b; Baines, 1998). De Klerk held secret talks with the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela to begin preparations for this major policy shift (Mandela, 1994a, b). By the end of 1990, not without encountering opposition and critics from within his own party, De Klerk released Mandela, unbanned the ANC, the PAC, and the SACP, and removed of restrictions on other political organizations. He also lifted the four-year-old media restrictions, and invited former liberation fighters to join the government at the negotiating table to prepare for a new multiracial constitution (Byrnes, 1996b, c).

Negotiations took place against a backdrop of political violence in the country, and resulted in South Africa's first non-racial election, which was won by the ANC. In 1994, a democratic political system under a lawfully elected ANC government was established in South Africa. The change from an internationally-ostracized minority regime to a sovereign state legitimized under international law had finally be completed (Melber, 2002; Orkins, 1995; Wing, 1995). This process culminated in the Constitutional reform of 1996 that saw the political system of South Africa completely renewed.

The South African tricameral parliament established in 1983 was composed by race-based chambers: House of Assembly – 178 white members, House of Representatives – 85 mixed-race members and the House of Delegates – 45 Indian members (Constitution, 1983). Needless to say, the Black population was not represented in Parliament (not even symbolically) and their right to vote was suppressed under Apartheid rule. The creation of the tricameral system was controversial on two fronts. On the one hand, many white conservatives

opposed the participation of non-whites in politics; On the other hand, many coloreds and Asians rejected the system, as the chambers reserved for them were powerless (Pisani et al., 1990; Byrnes, 1996c; Orkins, 1995). In fact, the institutional design of the political system left the Parliament weakened and the position of Prime Minister nullified. Most authority was transferred to the State President, including the power to appoint the Cabinet.

With the new Constitution, a bicameral Parliament came into power. The National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, consists of 400 members and is elected every five years by a system of party-list proportional representation. The National Council of Provinces, the upper house, consists of 90 members, with each of the nine provincial legislatures electing ten members (Constitution, 1996). This reform was not saluted unanimously by the international community. The first reforms in the post-Apartheid regime aimed at obtaining the right of self-determination and participation for the majority of the population, which had been segregated until then. The democratic transition was not given the same priority (Melber, 2002). Jung and Saphiro also argued that South Africa's new Constitution was not a progress towards democracy, but rather proposed a power-sharing system of government based on consociational principles (Jung and Saphiro, 1995; Anderweg, 2000; Lijphart, 1969). In consociational systems opposed parties are encouraged to participate in government, incentivized towards cooperation rather than presenting opposing points of view and therefore opposition is not valued. In the South African case, the Parliament is said to completely dominate the agenda-setting and the policy-making process, constraining the powers of the President of the Republic itself (Koeble and Reynolds, 1996; Anderweg, 2000; Lijphart, 1969).

For it is not of concern of this article to comment or analyze the quality of South African transition and reform – and more on the direction of this shift will be said in the following sections, it suffices here to say that a change in the political structure of South African political system has indeed occurred. This change can be attributed to a previous shift in the political culture of the population. It will be clarified later that political structures and cultures are intrinsically connected: For the Congruence Theory, political structure should be tuned with and appropriate for the culture it stems from. Incongruence among the two leads to pressure for change of structure (Almond and Verba, 1963, ed. 1989).

Thus, using the language of political culture theory, apartheid ultimately fell because the norms of racial separation, racial hierarchy and white superiority were rejected by the vast majority of the South African population. The political culture that once supported and justified racial segregation and the Apartheid rule had already undergone a major change that led to the change in the structure. However, according to Almond political views are inadvertently molded by direct experience

(Almond et al., 2008). Subsequent life experiences may change political perspectives. But patterns of socialization can unify or divide. The same event can affect or impact the entire nation and its sensibility and political culture similarly; it can also lead to political gaps among subcultures.

It is therefore very likely that after the shut of the racial segregation, South African population was exposed to a (political) resocialization, assisted by the reform in the educational system (Harber, 2001). In 1998 South Africa implemented a new school curriculum intended, among other things, to promote democratic and other constitutional values (Mattes, 2012). Thus, the 'Born Free' cohort have spent some or all of their high school years exposed to a pro-democracy curriculum and building their political cultures and orientations accordingly. As we shall see after, the schooling system and the values and norms passed in the early years of education are the roots of a political culture. Not surprisingly, schools are mentioned as "political socialization agents" by Almond himself (Almond et al., 2008: 52-56) (Figure 1).

The following two sections are going to first elaborate the theoretical and analytical framework and then analyze whether the political culture and/or structure in South Africa hanged after 1994 and whether consequentially the political system can be relocated in Almond's fourfold classification.

A POLITICAL SYSTEM: COMPONENTS AND MEASURES

The events that have occurred in South Africa during the 1990s have deeply influenced the country's society and history in the following years. The developments from then have been driven also by South Africa Educational reforms and by few other policies the Government implemented in order to integrate the classes of population that had been segregated until then. It was a relevant shift from the Apartheid regime that was brought about by an evident, urgent need expressed by the people and that manifested a deep change in the political culture of the country. The purpose of this article is to find out if these events and the consequential socio-political changes made the political system shift and how. In order to answer the research question, a clarification of some key concepts and the study methodology is necessary.

Political systems and changes of political system

One of the most relevant contributions to the definition of political system came in 1953 by David Easton. He suggested that the study of politics is concerned with understanding how each of its institutions (or actors)




Figure 1. Easton model of political system.
Source: Easton (1957).

interacts (Easton, 1953, 1957). It is indeed clear that “each part of the larger political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part; or, to put it positively, that the operation of no one part can be fully understood without reference to the way in which the whole itself operates” (Easton, 1957: 383) (emphasis added). Then, by combining the results, we obtain a rough picture of what happens in any self-contained political unit in which the separate parts interact systematically – the political system. His model of describing these relationships (Figure 1) has spread and became the basic model applied extensively for approaching the study of political science. According to Easton, the political system works as a machine, processing inputs – demands and support – received from the electorate and turning them into effective outputs – or policies (Easton, 1953, 1957). Scholars of that time and following agreed that the political system itself is a system of actions and interactions (Easton, 1953, 1957; Almond, 1965, 1956; Byrnes, 1996b; Pateman, 1971). The formula is very simple, but the theory was criticized for not being suitable for studying and explaining political change (Almond, 1965).

Gabriel Almond tried to shed light on the evolution and change of political systems by developing an alternative framework. In his work “A Developmental Approach to Political Systems” (1965), he asserts that the use of the concept of system reflects the penetration of functionalism and behaviouralism into political theory (Almond, 1965: 184; Malinowski, 1954; Radcliffe-Brown, 1957). Therefore, in order to analyze and understand the system, political scientists first have to empirically observe the behaviours of the social structures and institutions performing in the system (Almond, 1956, 1965). The two main components of a political system in Almond’s model are rôles and political cultures.

Rôles and changes in rôles’ interaction

A rôle is the unit of a political system (Almond, 1956, Parsons and Shils identify a rôle as “an organized sector

of an actor’s orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process” (Parsons and Shils, 1951: 23).

The concept can be further stretched to include formal offices, families, electorates and any form of social groupings that enter and affect the political system by interacting within it (Almond, 1956). Rôles are interdependent and their interaction affect the way the system works and is employed to deliver the requested outputs. The structure of rôles’ interaction is the first dimension of Almond’s model.

It can be differentiated – meaning that the functions and structure of the system are well defined and that power is distributed – or undifferentiated – meaning that the power is concentrated and that there is little division of rôles (ibid.). With this in mind, it can be inferred that their interactions are regulated by some basic rules, be these conventional or established. These are to be partially found in a country’s Constitution, which outlines the institutions interacting in the system and their specific functions within it (Duverger, 1980). If a Constitutional reform is implemented and the design and patterns of the relations are amended with it, the rôles themselves will change inherently (ibid.). However, a reform of the structure will not necessarily bring to a redistribution of power among rôles (and therefore to a shift in the classification). In order to fulfil the purpose of this article, the study will run a comparative document analysis of the two constitutions South Africa respectively adopted in 1983 and 1996, to test if power was actually redistributed by the latter among the modified institutions.

Political cultures and re-socialization

The specific patterns or orientations to political actions result from a set of core values, norms and perceptions of the political objects (Almond, 1956, 2000; Almond and Verba, 1963; Almond et al., 2008a; Dittmer, 1977; Melber, 2002; Silver and Dowley, 2000; Pateman, 1971). In their famous work “The Civic Culture”, Almond and

Table 1. Variables selected in WVS waves 1 and 6 as indicators for political culture homogeneity.

Variable	1982	2013
Activity in labor union	V31	V28
Activity in a political party	V32	V29
Aims of respondent – 1 st choice	V106	V62
Interest in politics	V117	V84
Confidence in Parliament	V144	V117
National pride	V205	V211

Source: Author.

Verba precisely define it as “the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 12-13) (emphasis added). A political culture is the result of childhood socialization, education, media exposure and adult experiences with governmental, social and economic performance and has therefore cognitive, affective and evaluative components (Almond, 2000). Knowledge and beliefs about political reality, feelings with respect to politics and commitments to political values are the main components and thus define the direction of a subject’s political action, ultimately affecting political and governmental structure and performance (Almond, 2000). Clearly political culture is not a static phenomenon: Changes can occur to and within the political culture itself. Although cultural norms typically change slowly and reflect stable values, political cultures change as people acquire their attitudes and values through the process of forming political values and transmitting the political culture from one generation to the next (Almond et al., 2008a). The socialization process can occur in different ways: Direct socialization involves an actor explicitly transferring political values or feelings; indirect socialization occurs when political views are inadvertently molded by experience (Almond et al., 2008a; Pateman, 1971). Moreover, although political culture is a common characteristic of a nation, values and beliefs can also vary within it: For instance, ethnic, religious or linguistic identities can shape citizens’ values and influence the birth of various political (sub-) cultures (ibid.; Silver and Dowley, 2000). Almond and Verba (1963) outlined three pure categories of political culture based on level and type of political participation and the nature of people’s attitudes toward politics: Parochial, subjective and participatory (Almond and Verba, 1963). However, for the purposes of this article another classification will be adopted. In his previous work on Comparative Political Systems (1956), Almond categorized political cultures as either homogeneous or heterogeneous, positioning this binary typology on the second dimension of his classification of political systems (Almond, 1956).

In order to measure the level of homogeneity of the South African political culture, this article will select six

variables from the WVS Waves 1 (1982) and 6 (2013) to observe whether the width of the variables’ variance has changed significantly in a 30-year time period (Table 1).

The variance is the most appropriate figure to measure the homogeneity of a political culture as it measures how far a set of (random) numbers are spread out from their average value. If the political culture is homogeneous, the variance shall be little; the more heterogeneous the political culture, the larger the variance will be, as the respondents’ perceptions will be spread far from the average value (Silver and Dowley, 2000). Following some critiques to his work (Dittmer, 1977), Almond distinguished three levels of system, process and policy, following that every political system has three levels of political culture – system, process and policy (Almond, 2000, 2008a). Although this further disaggregation is recognized and its interesting aspects that would make it worth exploring deeper, for resources, time and space constraints, the study will focus on the macro-level of the definition of political system and culture. However, broadly speaking and closely looking at the variables selected to measure the variation of political culture in South Africa, it is evident they recall the three levels pointed out by Almond (2008: 44): The National Pride is an example of the systemic level; the activity in labour unions and political parties and the interest in politics reflect the second aspect of political culture – process; the confidence in Parliament and the aims they would like the government to prioritize are perfect examples of citizens’ satisfaction and policy expectations (third level). At this point, it is clear that political culture and structure exist in a symbiotic relationship. Political culture helps to form and sustain particular political institutions and structure; yet institutions also socialize people who work within them as well as succeeding generations of youngsters who grow up accepting them. So institutions foster and support cultures as well (Almond et al., 2008: 21). The two are somehow interdependent: When the properties of one component in a system change, all the others, and the system as a whole, are affected. This could lead to a shift in the classification of political systems as illustrated in Table 2. A brief description of the four categories is necessary at this point (Almond, 1956).

Table 2. Fourfold classification of political systems by Almond.

Classification			Political culture	
			Homogeneous	Heterogenous
Rôles	Interactions' structure	Undiff.	Totalitarian	Pre-Industrialized
		Diff.	Anglo-American	Continental European

Source: Author.

Totalitarian

Highly centralized power makes the rôles structure undifferentiated and the political culture's homogeneity a façade to construct synthetic consent. Any delegation of power is strictly avoided and the structure is atomized, in order to destruct solidarity.

Pre-industrialized

A mix of political cultures and overlapping political systems can be observed in this context. Usually, the Western political culture and system have been forcefully implanted, and were never fully accepted. Rôles interact in unpredictable and unusual ways, not very structured and regulated.

Continental European

Political culture is fragmented in reminiscent old sub-cultures that somehow mixed with the Western political culture introduced lately. However, all the cultural variations share common roots and heritage. The political system is approached by rôles as a market on which they try to "sell" the political sub-culture they are embedded in, ultimately attempting to transform the political system itself.

Anglo-American

It is characterized by a secular and unified political culture, where the majority of actors share the broad political aims and means, in line with common values of freedom, mass welfare and security. Rôles' structure is highly differentiated and defined, as the rôles enjoy autonomy, but are also connected with each other in an organized and bureaucratized way, which gives stability to the system.

Having outlined the theoretical and analytical framework in which this article operates, next is to turn to the empirical qualitative study of the two South African Constitutions and to the quantitative analysis of the variance of the aggregate variables taken as indicators for the South African political culture.

ANALYSIS-ROLES INTERACTIONS AND POLITICAL CULTURES IN 1982 AND 2013

Constitutions and rôles' interactions

The 1982 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (No. 110) outlined a mixed system. The most powerful figure was the President of the Republic (PR hereby), who served as head of state and chief executive – leading the government, but was elected by the majority of votes in Parliament. The two had also the same mandate length, normally five years (Constitution, 1982; artt. 7-9, 37). The PR shared executive authority with a cabinet, which he appointed from the tricameral Parliament, and with a Ministers Council chosen by him from the majority in each House of Parliament. In addition, the PR relied on a sixty-member President's Council for advice on urgent matters and for resolution of eventual disagreements among Houses of Parliament. The President's Council included twenty members from the House of Assembly, ten from the House of Representatives, five from the House of delegates, fifteen nominated by the PR, and ten nominated by opposition party leaders (ibid. artt. 70-78).

The tricameral Parliament worked alongside the PR, but claimed to have much less power, as the latter could dissolve the Parliament, or could extend it by up to six months beyond its five-year term (Byrnes, 1996). A major change distinguished this Parliament from the previous one: It was composed by three chambers in order to increase colored and Indian representations. Indeed, it encompassed a (white) House of Assembly (166 members), a (colored) House of Representatives (80 members), and an (Indian) House of Delegates (40 members) (Constitution 1982, artt. 41-43). However, the representation was disproportional and the two "informally lower" houses were much less powerful than the House of Assembly (Baines, 2007). The three-chambered Parliament was based on a fundamental premise of the 1982 constitution, the distinction between a racial community's "own" affairs (encompassing education, health, housing, social welfare, local government, and some aspects of agriculture), and "general" affairs (encompassing defense, finance, foreign policy, justice, law and order, transport, commerce and industry, manpower, internal affairs, and overall agricultural policy). Thus, legislation "affecting the interests"

of one community was deliberated upon by the appropriate House, but legislation on "general affairs" of importance to all races was handled by all three Houses of Parliament (ibid. artt. 14-16, 30-31). The president signed all legislation, and he also exercised administrative responsibility for black affairs.

Finally, the jurisdictional powers were all in the hands of the Supreme Court of South Africa (ibid. PART VII), that held the supreme jurisdiction over the executive and legislative power, ensuring a clear distinction and separation between the two spheres on one hand and the jurisdictional powers on the other. Clearly, the power in the Apartheid regime was highly concentrated in the political figure of the PR, who held the executive power and had a strong control over the Parliament. In Almond's language, one could speak of undifferentiation in rôles' interactions structure, typical of Totalitarian and Pre-industrialized political systems. The new political system embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 was established after an interim constitution providing for a Government of National Unity and for a five-year transition, during which the final constitution would be drafted by the Constitutional Assembly, consisting of the combined Senate and National Assembly. The 1996 Constitution established a parliamentary system *sui generis*, as the PR is still head of State and of the government, and therefore entitled of the power of appointing and removal of the Vice President and the Ministers, but he or she cannot dissolve the Parliament (Constitution, 1996; art. 84). However, as established in the art. XXX the latter can revoke the confidence in the PR and the government by absolute majority. The PR is elected by the National Assembly among its members for a five-year term and his/her mandate can be renewed only once. When elected, the PR loses the right to vote in Parliament (ibid. art. 86).

While the executive power is held by the PR and the Cabinet, the legislative is strongly controlled by the bicameral Parliament, composed by the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces. The former is the low chamber, composed by 350-400 members elected for 3 years (extended to 5 in later amendments) with a party-list proportional electoral system. It can consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation and initiate or prepare legislation, except money bills (ibid. artt. 44-46, 55, 73). It also elects the PR and has power of amendment of the Constitution. The second chamber is composed of a single delegation from each province consisting of ten delegates (90 members in total, see art.103) (ibid. art. 60). Each province has one vote, which is cast on behalf of the province by the head of its delegation and its powers coincide with the ones of the National Assembly, except being slightly diminished on certain affairs. Its decisions are taken with at least five provinces in favor of the question (ibid. art. 65, 68).

The 1996 Constitutions is still in force today. It clearly

states that the government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, but all must observe and adhere to the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations: "An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute" (ibid. art. 40-41). Thus, whilst it clearly defines a separation of the different rôles and a differentiated structure in their interaction to distribute the powers – as an Anglo-American or Continental European Constitution would do – it also recognizes the risks and tries to prevent the disputes that may arise in what is perhaps still perceived as a highly differentiated and conflictual context of co-existence between different political cultures. The next section explores this aspect.

Political cultures

As mentioned in the theoretical section, the homogeneity of a political culture of a country is measurable with the variance width of the sample. The variance measures how far a set of (random) numbers are spread out from their average value: If the political culture is homogeneous, the variance shall be little; the more heterogeneous the political culture, the larger the variance will be, as the respondents' perceptions will be spread far from the average value (see above). Following several previous works that applied this approach to study political cultures (Ross, 2000; Melber, 2002; Silver and Dowley, 2000), six variables were selected from the WVS Waves 1 (1982) and 6 (2013) and computed them into a single variable Political Culture, in order to observe whether the width of the variable's variance has changed significantly in a 30-year time period. This large time period allows for a generational change to occur, and the consequent shift of political culture that is expected or likely to follow a diriment event such as the fall of the Apartheid regime. Furthermore, the educational reform implemented after 1994 exposed young generations and the following 'Born Frees' to values and resocialization compared to the previous generation (Mattes, 2012), which makes a change in the political culture even more likely.

The six variables selected are present and have the same alternative answers in both waves, and are therefore particularly reliable for comparison. Activity in labor union and in political initiatives scales from "non-member", to "inactive member", to "active member". Aims of respondents show the priorities the individual thinks the government should pursue in its policies. The alternatives are "maintaining order in the nation", "giving people more say in important government decisions",




Figure 2. Histogram showing the distribution and variance of the South African Political Culture in 1982.
Source: Author.

“fighting rising prices”, “protecting freedom of speech”; finally confidence in Parliament, Interest in politics and National Pride can rate “not at all” (confident; interested; proud), “not very much”, “somewhat” and “very much”.

To run the descriptive analysis of the variables, the study used SPSS and the data provided by the World Values Survey database and isolated the data for South Africa. In order to analyze the variance of the computed variable Political Culture, it was first recoded all the variables in order to make them go in the same direction and have more clarity. For example, Confidence in Parliament scored 3 for very interested and 0 for Not at all interested, while Activity in both political party and labor unions had the reversed scale (namely, 0 for Active member and 3 for Not a member). Therefore, all the variables were recorded consistently in both waves so to score 0 the less or absent engagement in politics or satisfaction with the system (Not a member, Not at all interested in politics, confident in parliament or proud). Then, the six variables were computed into one single Political Culture variable in both waves and a descriptive analysis of the variance, range and mean was done. Histograms were included in order to give a graphic representation of the variance (Figures 2 and 3).

The analysis of the first wave shows a quite homogeneous political culture. The variance for the South African sample is 6,085 and the Standard Deviation is 2,467. The distribution is normal, as the

histogram shows, and a peak can be observed in correspondence of the mean. This aspect suggests a small variation in individuals’ opinions and the relatively small width of the curve indicates a relatively homogeneous political culture. Of course there is some variation, but one could argue if this set of political culture combined with the undifferentiated political system previously observed could be indicative of a pre-industrialized political system tending to totalitarianism. After all, the Apartheid was in a sense a dictatorship of the South African white minority and my research of the field has brought to the evidence that the governments under the Apartheid regime provided wrong or distorted information and education to the South African population in order to build a fitting (political) culture and to maintain the regime (INT. 01, 2019).

The second wave had a larger sample compared to the first one: 3287 people took part in the survey, while they were only 1200 in the first wave. Although the variance does not depend on the sample size, one could expect a decrease of the variance given and an increase of the sample size as an effect of the Law of Large Numbers – as sample size increases, cases will converge to the mean, reducing the variance. However, as Figure 3 shows, in 2013, after the Apartheid regime fell and the generational change had time to root in the society, the variance of the political culture doubled to 12,423 compared to the one in 1982.




Figure 3. Histogram showing the distribution and variance of the South African Political Culture in 2013.
Source: Author.

The difference is also appreciable by looking at the two histograms: The second shows a wider base and the distribution is less peaked in the center, meaning both that the Standard Deviation is higher (3,525 in 2013) and that opinions are more heterogeneous, as they differ more from one another. This evident enlargement and heterogeneous movement cross-checked with the change observed in the Constitution and rôles' interactive structure after 1994, make a reconsideration of the political system necessary. In 30 years, South Africa went through a drastic change from what was a very centralized power setting and a quite homogeneous political culture to a well-defined and power-distributing Constitution and a wider, more heterogeneous political culture.

The answer to the initial research question is therefore positive: The aforementioned change can also be read as a shift of South African political system from a Pre-Industrialized/Totalitarian system to the Continental European type, where political culture is fragmented in reminiscent old sub-cultures. Indeed, today's South Africa is also called the 'Rainbow Nation' due to its population's diversity: It has 11 official languages and recognized population groups, which nonetheless share common roots and heritage. The diversities often create conflicts within the society and are mirrored by the political actors, who approach the political system as a market on which

they try to "sell" the political sub-culture they are embedded in. However, the interactions between rôles is well defined and differentiated, as each institution has powers, checks and balances and the power is not centralized as it was in the Apartheid regime.

CONCLUSION

This article aims to analyze the cultural and political change occurring in South Africa after the fall of the Apartheid regime in 1994. Building on the work of Almond and Verba, a political system is composed by the interaction of rôles (differentiated and undifferentiated) and the political culture (heterogeneous and homogeneous) in a country (Almond, 1956, 2000; Almond and Verba, 1963; Almond et al., 2008). This leads to a four-fold classification reported in Table 2: A political system is classifiable either as Totalitarian, Pre-industrialized, Continental European or Anglo-American (Almond, 1956). A change in one of the two components is likely to trigger a change in the other, as well as a shift of the system from one type to the other (*ibid.*). Previous studies and observations had reported that such a shift can occur, *inter alia*, after a marking event affecting the whole population of a country (Almond, 1956, 2000; Almond and Verba, 1963; Almond et al., 2008; Dittmer,

1977; Melber, 2002; Silver and Dowley, 2000; Pateman, 1971).

After 46 years of racial domination of the white minority (informally, it started much earlier) and violent riots and protests, the segregation regime was shut under President de Klerk and the first democratic election were held in 1994. The rest, as it is said, is history. The election of Nelson Mandela led to a Constitutional reform that changed the structure of the interactions between political institutions and actors, making it more differentiated and less power-centered. The political culture that was to a certain extent synthetically held more homogeneous than it would have been became more heterogeneous after the marking events of 1994, as the educational reform was implemented and the generational change rooted in the new generations. The diffusion of democratic values and a higher degree of freedom in the country also contributed to diversify opinions and to the widening of the political culture heterogeneity, making the system shift from a Pre-industrialized/Totalitarian political system to a Continental European one.

The answer to the initial research question is therefore positive: The events and movements in the early 1990s triggered a change in the South African political culture and political interactions. This ultimately leads to a shift of the system according to Almond's classification from a Pre-industrialized/Totalitarian political system to a Continental European one. However, there are aspects of this shift this article could not address, but that would be a good starting point for future research. In particular it is worth noting that most analyses of political culture have assumed the existence of a national political culture. The article also shared this approach. To ascribe a political culture to a society implicitly assumes that the members of a society share some common attitudes and values. However, the assumption of common values is often better met by ethnic groups than by the aggregate population of an entire country, especially in an ethnically diverse environment as South Africa is. Ethnic identifications are a principal alternative to national affiliations (Silver and Dowley, 2000) and the most likely source of systematic within-country variation in political culture. The level of agreement on basic political values by members of different ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies may be critical to the analysis of the political system as a whole, and for sure it is an aspect worth exploring in future research.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Review

Transformations of forced migration in Africa: Issues and general problems

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Over the past two decades, migration in Africa has been rising continuously in all subregions. The range of migration flows include a rise in migrant workers, female migrants, an increase in irregular migration as well as a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. It is no secret that current scholarship, especially the literature that concerned international organizations have adopted, has been unable to explicate the various dimensions of the phenomenon of migration and displacement in the context of Africa. Effective study of migration in Africa may require the "Africanization" of all related concepts to serve as a tool for analysis in accordance with a cultural pan-African perspective. This study seeks to explore the current transformations to the phenomenon of international migration in Africa, the most important factors driving it, and what policies and future challenges it faces. The paper uses a qualitative research design involving a literature review.

Key words: Migration, refugees, displaced persons, feminization of migration, environmental refugees.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, debates and public policies on migration and forced displacement have largely focused on the Mediterranean region and Europe (Beauchemin, 2015). Biased paradigms and narratives have resulted in a general disregard for migration and displacement issues in Africa, despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest number of refugees, about 26% or more of the total refugee population in the world¹. Moreover, international migration routes in Africa are concentrated within the region, making the phenomenon of migration one of the major challenges facing the African states (United Nations Children's Fund, 2019). Migration within

Africa itself became in the last decade much more prevalent than migration from Africa to Europe or migration in other parts of the world (Whitaker, 2017; Ruysen and Rayp, 2014; Bayar and Aral, 2019).

Review of the literature on migration and refugees underscores the urgent need to identify and analyze the regional, national, and internal conflicts that drive the forced migration of the continent's citizens, and the impact such events have on the life experiences of those Africans who have had to flee their homes (Ricca, 1990; Agadjanian, 2008). A full understanding requires exploring the effects of these conflicts, their spatial and physical forms, as well as the operations of refugees, internally displaced persons, and persons displaced by environmental factors. Migrants may establish a network of material and economic resources during their escape trips and after resettlement. Such resources are crucial to facilitating survival and sustainability in new refuge areas.

Forced migration requires forging new identities for

¹The bulk of international emigrants outside of Africa have gone to Europe (55%) and to Asia (26%), mostly the Arab Gulf States. While this inter-continental emigration is driven mostly by countries in Northern Africa, in both Eastern Africa and Western Africa migration is primarily contained within the region: Around 70% of migrants in each area stayed within the same region (United Nations Children's Fund. UNICEF, 2019).

refugees in urban areas, those residing in refugee camps, internally displaced persons, or refugees who have been resettled abroad. Studying issues of migration and refugees in Africa from an Africanness perspective serves to eliminate stereotypes of Africa as a continent of people living in perpetual tragedy, suffering from the ravages of war and famine, enduring endless refugee streams, and in need of assistance and charity. Forced migration is a global issue, and Africa is no exception (Danzinger, 2019). Africa as a diverse continent has become a showcase for how people, communities, and states deal with the immense human challenges posed by forced migration.

The extant literature, especially that which is adopted by consulted international organizations, is incapable of elucidating the myriad dimensions of migration and displacement in its African context. Indeed, even international law's way of defining a refugee fails to capture the various dimensions of the phenomenon in its African reality. This may require the "Africanization" of these concepts so as to serve as a tool for analysis in accordance with an inclusive African civilizational perspective. This study seeks to explore the most important transformations witnessed by the phenomenon of international migration in Africa, the most important factors driving it, and what policies and future challenges? This paper considers that the qualitative approach has particular importance for forced migration studies, taking into account its ability to produce a rich and in-depth analysis. It also allows exploration of the complex and multi-faceted dimensions of migration dynamics. The data was collected from documentary materials such as journals, books and Internet sources. And with regard to data analysis, descriptive and analytical techniques were combined. Therefore, the discussion depended on systematic analysis and the use of tables and figures.

The study argues that Africa is a region of diverse circles of migration related to origin, destination, and transit. Migration in Africa is both voluntary and forced within and beyond national borders. Forced migration is fraught with controversial and sometimes contradictory interpretations. Voluntary migration is based on one's free will and initiative. It refers to migrants who leave their homes and reside elsewhere in search of economic opportunities such as employment, trade, and education. However, forced migration refers to people's movement due to social and political problems such as armed conflict, human rights violations, and environmental disasters. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has defined forced migration as "A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists,

including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g., movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)" (Ionesco, 2017, p. 130).

It is clear that the IOM definition of forced migrant comprises refugee and asylum seeker. In most cases forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and to protect themselves from an imminent threat to their physical well-being. This paper aims to give more attention to African refugees who were forced to flee their homes and go elsewhere.

The paper has four parts. The first reviews the fundamental transformations in the migration phenomenon in Africa. Far from the traditional interpretations of African migration, which is mainly driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, the increase in migration rates from and within Africa seems to be driven by accelerated social and economic changes that have increased Africans' capacities and aspirations for migration, which has led to new trends in population mobility. The second part examines the main migration routes in Africa where four routes can be discussed according to the nature of the relationship between countries of origin and refuge. The third part provides an attempt to understand the phenomenon of migration in Africa more deeply. Finally, the fourth part discusses the evolution of African policies in the face of migration challenges and future impacts.

TRENDS IN THE MAJOR TRANSFORMATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

International migration in Africa is complex, highly interrelated, and involves many important transformations, the most notable of which is the transition from the concept of a traditional refugee to an environmental refugee and the feminization of migration. Despite the persistence of traditional waves of refugees and their multiple motivations and sources, smuggling and human trafficking complement this sad and complex picture of the international migration map in Africa. Wood (2019, 290-292) sets out a principled framework for interpreting and applying Africa's expanded refugee definition. The framework goes beyond merely reciting the relevant international principles: it analyses their scope, applicability to Africa's expanded refugee definition, and implications for the interpretation of the definition's terms.

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From traditional refugees to environmental refugees

When the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) arose in the aftermath of the Second World War, the term "refugee" included anyone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal, and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries.

However, this definition was found lacking as it excludes a range of other refugee situations. In response, Essam El-Hinnawi (1985) identified a new category of forced refugees, dubbed *environmental refugees*, which refers to people who flee from their places of origin for environmental reasons such as drought, earthquakes, or environmental degradation resulting from armed conflict, wars for natural resources, and so on. IOM defined environmental migrants as persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad. (IOM, 2011, 33)

For environmental reasons, the issue of migration has become extremely important in sub-Saharan Africa. There are still unresolved issues and problems, particularly with regard to statistics and the reasons for such patterns of migration as well as with what policies are needed to address them. The literature on refugees in Africa before the 1980s failed to analyze the dynamics of the interplay among environmental, social, political and economic factors driving the waves of migration. In fact, some of the factors causing the phenomenon of migration cannot be isolated from the general context and the main actors (Epule, 2015).

Interestingly, the vast majority of environmental refugees come from the Sahel and the Sahara Desert region, which comprises some 17 African countries, from Senegal in West Africa to northern Eritrea in East Africa. Most of the population in this region suffers from threats associated with climate change. Political instability caused by civil wars, coups d'état, and lack of respect for human rights have also pushed people in rural and nomadic areas to cross national borders as a way of salvation and emancipation (Zoubir, 2012). In any case, about 70% of African migrants had to leave their homelands because of poverty and unemployment. Because about 64% of Africans and nearly 90% of Ethiopians depend specifically on agriculture for their livelihoods (Davis et al., 2017), the environmental variable becomes critical to knowing the new trends of migration in Africa.

The female face of international migration

General patterns of migration and refugees, both within and outside Africa, have been linked to the movement of men. That is, migrations have been seen as a purely masculine issue. Since the 1960s, gender has not been considered an important factor in understanding the drivers of international migration in Africa. However, recent trends point decisively to an increase in independent migration amongst African women. In Europe, only 39% of the refugee population was female in 2017, compared to 51% in Africa (UNHCR, 2018). African women migrate independently and the remittances that they send are necessary to family survival. While unfavorable economic conditions represent a common motivation for both men and women attempting to exit across national borders, women have other motives, such as searching for a more secure environment in terms of gender equality (Adepoju, 2004). Female migration in countries such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, and Mali show that female migrants are motivated by the desire to secure economic independence through self-employment or wage income (Adepoju, 1995). Furthermore, Gouws (2010) argued that as more women become educated, they migrate independently to support their own economic independence and to follow professional careers such as health care, for example.

There is no doubt that the feminization of the migration phenomenon has led to fundamental shifts in the roles of the African family in terms of the nature of the relationship between the sexes, a shift which has presented major challenges for public policymakers. For example, a large number of Burkinabe women flooded Ivory Coast in the pre-civil war period to work in the informal business sector, which is less affected by economic crises than the wage sector in which most migrant workers usually work. Along these lines, Adepoju (2008) has argued that professional women, both single and married, now engage in international migration. Married women leave their spouses behind with the children, who, in a reversal of responsibilities, are looked after by their fathers, or by other female members of the family. The remittances these women send home are a lifeline for family sustenance. This phenomenon of independent female migration constitutes an important change, and clearly can imply a turn-around in traditional gender roles, again creating new challenges for public policy.

Refugee workers and the phenomenon of xenophobia

The Ubuntu culture in traditional African thought calls for hospitality toward guests and welcoming strangers, which has made countries such as Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia the top of the list of countries receiving

refugees². However, since the 1990s have demonstrated hostility towards foreigners in some African countries. The hate speech espoused by some politicians and opinion leaders in countries such as Ivory Coast, Libya, and South Africa has served to discriminate between citizens and foreigners. African refugees have been accused of spreading chronic disease or attempting to seize limited resources. There is no doubt that the situation of refugees and migrants is fraught with two-sided risks: persecution in their countries of origin, on one hand, and threats in the countries of refuge, on the other. Consider, for example, the refugee's journey to South Africa, along which they must cross the Limpopo River in the summer and autumn at the peak of its flood. En route, survivors fall prey to gangsters who rob them of their money and rape their women (Adepoju, 2004).

The word 'xenophobia' derives from two Greek words, 'xénos', which means a person that looks different, a stranger, or a foreigner and 'phóbos' which means literally fear or horror. Thus, xenophobia is defined as perceived fear, hatred, or dislike of a non-native or foreigner in a particular country. In Africa, some of these manifestations date as far back as the 1960s. There have been many displays of xenophobia. For example, waves of terrorist attacks by the Somali al-Shabaab group incited negative reactions to Somali communities in Kenya (Oni and Okunade, 2018).

In South Africa, invectives against refugees revolve around one meaning: 'Return to Your Country', 'South Africa is not yours', and 'You steal our works, our homes, our wives'. Refugees there struggle to access services such as banking and work permits, for which they are often required to pay a bribe to obtain or renew. They also suffer from lack access to appropriate accommodations because most owners refuse to accept the permits of refugees and asylum-seekers (Hassim, 2008).

The dialectic of migration and displacement

The major problem facing the international migration phenomenon in Africa resides in the nature of the relationship between migration and displacement, whereby sub-Saharan Africa hosts more displaced people than the number of persons who have migrated abroad. Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid

the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border" (Deng, 1999).

The above definition mentions some of the most common causes of involuntary movements, such as armed conflict, violence, human rights violations and disasters. In addition to that, such mobility takes place within national borders. There were about 18.4 million IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017, up sharply from 14.1 million in 2016, the largest regional increase of forcibly displaced people in the world. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Sudan, and Nigeria are among the African countries with the greatest concentrations of displaced persons. It is, indeed, striking that, in spite of an international convention concerning refugees that is more than half a century old and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the legal regime for the internal displacement of populations is much weaker.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are usually broadly defined as the predominant normative framework for IDPs. While these principles derive from international law, they are not binding in themselves. There is no specialized United Nations agency to address the needs of IDPs (despite progress made in recent years in assigning responsibility for IDP issues to relevant United Nations agencies); as such, it remains the responsibility of national governments to protect and assist IDPs within their own borders. Long-term displacement presents a stumbling block to finding sustainable solutions. For example, individuals often place land seizures on property left behind by the displaced, which makes the issue of land and property restitution complex, especially in cases where most people acquire land through customary law, as is the case in Africa. In Darfur, where nearly 2.4 million displaced persons live largely in camps which constitute difficult living environments, lack of security, education, and health services in indigenous communities complicate efforts to find durable solutions (OCHA, 2019).

MAP OF MIGRANTS' ROUTES IN AFRICA

There are many signs that African migrants are more likely to move elsewhere within the continent than outside it. Figure 1 shows that 27% of Africans are more likely to move to another country within the same region in the continent. While migration to Europe via life-threatening journeys across the desert and the Mediterranean as well as to North America through immigration programs and asylum applications has dominated the headlines, Africans are more likely to migrate to another African country. A new Afro barometer survey of respondents in 34 African countries shows that 36% of Africans are more likely to move to another country within the continent.

²Ubuntu philosophy could be interpreted as "a person is a person through other persons." The actions that produce harmony, reduce discord, and develop community are simultaneously the actions that perfect one's valuable nature as a social being. Nelson Mandela maintained that Ubuntu asserts that the common ground of our humanity is greater and more enduring than the differences that divide us. It is so, and it must be so, because we share the same fateful human condition. We are creatures of blood and bone, idealism and suffering (Lutz, 2009)




Figure 1. Top destination for intending African migrants.
Source: Appiah et al. (2019).

Table 1. Major refugee destinations vs. total migration in Africa 2017.

Country	#Refugees	Total (%)
Uganda	1,350,504	21.54
Sudan	906,599	14.42
Ethiopia	889,412	14.18
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	537,087	8.56
Kenya	431,901	6.89
Chad	411,482	6.56
Cameroun	314,406	5.01
Tanzania	308,528	4.92
Total	5,149,919	82.15
Total Africa (excluding North Africa)	6,268,200	100

Source: UNHCR (2018). Global Trends: Forced Displacement 2017
<https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf>

Only 20% of African migrants who decide to migrate from their own countries are leaving the continent, according to the AU (Appiah, et al., 2019). For example, more people from the Horn of Africa move to Southern Africa than those who cross the North African desert to reach Europe (Figure 1).

As Table 1 shows, the top eight destinations for refugees in Africa are Uganda (1,350,504), Sudan (906,599), Ethiopia (889,412), Democratic Republic of the Congo (537,087), Kenya (431,901), Chad (411,482), Cameroon (314,406), and Tanzania (308,528) which constitutes a total of 5,149,919 refugees of foreign origin (UNHCR, 2018). These refugees receive support and

assistance in camps spread throughout these countries. The impact of the refugee crisis on each country varies according to the proportion of these figures to their total population. For example, Uganda provides support to a number of refugees, constituting a total of about 3.2% of the country's population. These ratios are also high in Chad, which hosts refugees representing about 2.9% of its total population. Sub-Saharan Africa, as the largest refugee region in the world, has 6.2 million refugees, compared to 3.4 million in Asia and the Pacific. The refugee population in East Africa increased dramatically during 2017, mainly due to the crisis in South Sudan, from which more than one million people fled, primarily to

Table 2. International Migration in Africa's sub regions.

Region	International migrants (in thousands)		International migrants (% of total population)		Female migrants (%)	
	2015	2000	2015	2000	2015	2000
Africa	14,800.3	20,649.6	2	2	47	46
East Africa	4,844.8	6,129.1	2	2	49	49
Central Africa	1,756.7	2,307.7	2	2	49	50
North Africa	1,885.7	2,159.0	1	1	44	41
Southern Africa	1,222.3	3,435.2	2	5	41	41
West Africa	5,090.9	6,618.5	2	2	47	47

Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD (2018).

Sudan and Uganda.

Four major subregions of the phenomenon of immigration and displacement in Africa can be mapped out in terms of the dialectical relationship between countries of origin and host countries, as follows:

The Sahel-West African region

This region stretches from Mauritania and the Gulf of Guinea West to the shores of Eritrea East and represents the refugee crisis belt in Africa. Table 2 shows the volume of African migrants in absolute terms, and as a proportion of the total population in the region. There, some 20 million people suffer from frequent violent conflicts, volatile weather patterns, epidemics, and other calamities that are perpetuated by food insecurity and malnutrition. At the beginning of 2015, the region saw about 2.8 million IDPs. As the armed conflict in north-eastern Nigeria escalated at the hands of Boko Haram, an estimated one million people were forced to flee internally. Around 150,000 Nigerian refugees have managed to flee to neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Unstable security in Northern Mali continues to be a source of instability for the lives of civilians, hampering the return of refugees (Vigil, 2017). Around 133,000 Malian refugees still live in Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and more than 80,000 remain internally displaced. On the other hand, due to the ongoing crisis in the Lake Chad Basin, Chad has become the seventh largest refugee host country in the world, with more than 750,000 displaced persons, mostly refugees, and returnees who have fled from the Central African Republic, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan.

The Horn of Africa

This region can be seen as a complement to what we might call the arc of crisis, with its extension in the great Sahel region, where armed conflicts have long led to the flight of millions of people for safety. One of the most

striking of these wars and conflicts is the war between Ethiopia and Somalia for the control of the Ogaden region (1977-1978), the War of Eritrean Liberation, the civil war in the Sudan, the Eritrean Ethiopian conflict, and the civil war in Southern Sudan. Most of the refugees from these conflicts have been able to obtain shelter within the states of the same country as well as in neighboring countries such as Egypt and Kenya.

The Great Lakes region

Due to tribal factors and political conflicts in states such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda, the Great Lakes Region has become the epicenter of migration, with millions of refugees arriving over the past decades in the post-independence period. Most countries in the Great Lakes region have hosted these refugees, notably Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, as well as countries that are among the most popular country of origin and refuge at the same time such as the DRC.

Southern Africa

The countries of Southern Africa have received and continue to receive thousands of refugees forced to leave their countries due to struggles against colonialism, apartheid, and civil strife. Some countries, such as Mozambique and Angola, face a formidable challenge in dealing with hundreds of thousands of returnees, demobilized soldiers, and internally displaced persons. South Africa's experience points to another type of asylum: the phenomenon of refugees in urban areas.

TOWARDS A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHENOMENON OF MIGRATION IN AFRICA

Most scholars point to the tribal factor as the main cause of the refugee problem in Africa (Atim, 2013; Anthony, 1991). This view is based on the assumption that artificial boundaries inherited from the colonial era do not

represent homogeneous regions inhabited by common ethnic or linguistic groups. In short, with decolonization, the different (traditionally conflicting) ethnic groups found themselves constrained by the geographical boundaries of the nation state inherited from the colonial era. The failure of national integration after independence meant there was almost no way for these groups to coexist peacefully. At the same time, some writers argue that ethnic identity is itself one of the main causes of the refugee problem in Africa. Some individuals are victimized and forced to migrate or to seek asylum simply because they have a different ethnic identity than those who exercise power in the state. One prominent example in the Great Lakes region is the bloody Hutu-Tutsi conflict, which has led to massive flows of refugees into neighboring states.

But the tendency of many analysts to posit cultural and racial differences as the leading causes of civil wars, political crises, and conflicts on the continent is flawed and misleading. This explanation casts blame on internal causes, which may themselves be symptoms of critical external roles and factors. Thus, the legacy of colonialism and the failure of post-independence nation states to manage certain aspects of their colonial legacies including the inability to absorb multiple forms of loyalties and affiliations within the state, has in turn, led to political instability, and even put the national state project itself to the test.

Independent African states have agreed to maintain the boundaries inherited from the colonial era by upholding the principle of 'sanctity of colonial boundaries. As such, it is unacceptable to attempt to modify those limits by force. However, the continent has witnessed numerous separatist attempts in Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea, and the Ogaden, to name a few. There is no doubt that the situation in the Ogaden and South Sudan reflects the failure of both colonial powers and national governments to recognize the importance of demographic and ethnic factors in the delineation of national borders.

For example, Mamdani (2018) believes that the structural crises facing Africa are simply manifestations of the post-colonial crisis. Mamdani (2018) posited that structures of political instability and current conflict reside in the nature of the processes of formation and building of the colonial state, which eventually produced multiple political and ethnic identities.

One salient feature of the colonial system was 'institutionalized discrimination', which upheld a duality of laws (masters and slaves) and special legal regimes for different ethnic groups. Understanding this colonial context is undoubtedly necessary to grasping the current political crises in the region; however, it does not explain why most leaders, despite their knowledge of the weak foundation on which their inherited state was based, have tended to maintain systems that exploit resources and protect colonial interests rather than implement reforms which can address situations of inequality and maintain

the diversity of ethnicities that shape the mosaic of new nations by recognizing the principle of equal citizenship.

War and civil strife are major causes of the refugee crisis in Africa. The past decade has seen a steady rise in violence across sub-Saharan Africa, such as Mali, South Sudan, Central Africa, and Somalia. Over time, the number of states experiencing armed conflict has doubled to 22. In the 1990s, some of these conflicts grew to be major regional wars, such as those in Liberia, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The simmering tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which ended in a fierce war between the two states, also led to major waves of refugees and displacement. Such phenomena indicate that the post-Cold War era has not led to the realization of the dream of an African renaissance, as more than a quarter of sub-Saharan African countries have been left suffering from armed civil strife or regional tensions.

Many Africans have resorted to exile for environmental reasons, because the land in which they live is unfit for habitation or is no longer viable or arable. Not surprisingly, African countries affected by soil erosion, drought, and other environmental hazards are also in stages of armed conflict, recurrent famine, and refugee movement. The most notable examples are the states in the Sahel, the Sahara, and the Horn of Africa, and Mozambique.

As a whole, many of the causes of conflict and forced displacement in Africa, such as human rights violations, political power struggles, economic wealth, ethnic antagonism, and civil war, are symptomatic of deeper and more interconnected problems. In particular, we note the failure of most post-colonial leaders to reform the colonial state and reorganize power by establishing stable institutions that allow for the peaceful administration of power and the equitable distribution of social and economic opportunities and resources. In short, the ruling elite has failed to deal with the problem of citizenship and social justice.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it can be inferred that the migration of Africans cannot be attributed to a single factor; it is a very complex process in which 'push' and 'pull' factors interact. Figure 2 summarizes a variety of push and pulls factors. 'Push' factors mean that migrants are forced to move out of their homelands due to social, political, economic, environmental, and demographic drivers (Figure 2). In the case of 'pull' factors, migrants are attracted by opportunities in new locations. The effect of these factors differs from one individual to another, because the causes differ. People react to threats differently, to the extent that a mere rumor is enough to make some flee their homes.

CHANGES IN AFRICAN POLICY AND REFUGEE CHALLENGES

The emergence of the refugee protection system in Africa




Figure 2. Drivers of migration in Africa.
Source: Vigil (2017).

dates to the period of decolonization, with its increasing number of refugees and displaced persons. At the time, there was a need to address the inadequacy of the international refugee protection regime. Accordingly, African states established a complementary system for the protection of refugees which, over the years, has contributed to the development of new legal instruments, the analysis of which will respond to the question of whether an innovative African system for the protection of refugees is likely to have an effective impact on the development of sustainable solutions to this crisis (Nicolosi, 2014).

Three main stages of development of African policies and protection systems concerning refugees can be distinguished as follows:

(1) The first phase, stretching from the early 1960s to the end of the 1980s, is usually called the 'open door policy' stage. African states, individually and collectively, have adopted welcoming refugee situations within the framework of the 1969 Convention on Refugees adopted by the Organization of African Unity (Nyanduga, 2005; Oyelade, 2008). As Mwalimu Julius Nyerere put it: 'We saw refugees coming out of colonial countries and our idea was, treat these people well'. African leaders never expected that, after independence, there would still be refugees and internally displaced persons (Okello, 2014). (2) The second phase covers the period from 1990 to 2001, during which the security risks and economic burdens of the asylum phenomenon increased, effectively ending the open-door policy. This shift is

perhaps one of the most significant factors contributing to the increasing complexity and interrelatedness of the international asylum phenomenon in Africa. Moreover, the increase in transnational migration resulted in the expansion of relations between states of origin and states of refuge in the African context. The negative effects associated with the presence of refugee camps in host countries, such as the spread of crime, impact on the environment, and the depletion of limited resources, and have led many African States to refuse to accept refugees from other countries.

(3) The third phase comprises the years following the establishment of the African Union. Perhaps the fundamental turning point here was the union's call for member states to consider forced displacement to be a serious violation of human rights in security, peace, and dignity. This new orientation was enshrined in the Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in 2003. If the interest of the Organization of African Unity was primarily focused on the issue of asylum, the African Union addressed the issues of displacement and placed dealing with such issues at the forefront.

Despite a multiplicity of legal texts in the collective of African initiatives for the protection of refugees, there is the pressing issue of effectiveness (AU, 2018). A number of researchers are examining the usefulness of these initiatives and African countries' ability to cope with these complex and multidimensional crises. For example, Nyanduga (2005) raised the issue of accountability for violations of refugee rights which is largely absent in African practice. Given the increasing numbers of asylum

and displacement in many parts of Africa, the African legal system has been unable to provide adequate protection or a better life for refugees. At the international level, the refugee crisis in sub-Saharan Africa is receiving limited attention in international forums and organizations. Many host countries in the region have a weak or non-existent capacity to provide support to refugees. At the same time, international organizations entrusted with the management of humanitarian operations on the continent are experiencing a significant lack of resources.

These concerns have led to further challenges for both the states of origin and the states of asylum in terms of problems of political instability, civil strife, and low rates of economic growth, as in the Great Lakes region. One of the most significant challenges facing refugees in host countries is the lack of a secure environment within their camps and areas of residence; for example, hundreds of Hutu refugees in the DRC were killed by rebel groups. Jacobsen presented (1999) three reasons why refugee camps are more vulnerable to armed attack. First, the camps include some former combatant refugees, which make them a target by hostile forces both in the country of origin and in the country of refuge. Second, the camps can be seen as a repository, or warehouse, for recruiting exploited sexual and economic labor. Third, regional cross-border conflicts target refugee camps as part of the military strategy to weaken opposition morale or to commit ethnic cleansing.

Although the lives of refugees outside refugee camps are not always safe because they are targeted through armed attacks, their safety is also threatened by the residents of the host country. The influx of refugees into a socially and economically fragile environment poses a threat to the scarce resources of the poorer host nation population, and refugees are therefore targeted. As such, refugees become scapegoats for social problems and are relentlessly victimized by xenophobic measures, human rights violations, and negative images propagated by the media and opinion leaders in society (Palmary, 2004). One recent example presented itself in South Africa, where, since 2008, waves of xenophobic attacks have been perpetrated throughout the country, mostly towards African refugees and asylum-seekers. Local residents often accuse refugees of stealing local jobs and of taking part in criminal acts. Unlike many countries, South Africa is seeing many refugees move into urban areas seeking access to basic services, such as housing, sanitation, and water, on an equal footing with South African citizens. This influx places an additional burden on local government and incites the dissemination of negative images of foreign refugees.

CONCLUSION

The issue of forced migration and displaced persons in

Africa raises many concerns and problems, not only because of its humanitarian importance but also because of its impact on peace, security, and stability within Africa and the international security regime as a whole. Refugees in Africa are usually forced to flee their homes due to violence, armed conflict, and/or massive violations of human rights. The refugee problem, therefore, is essentially a man-made phenomenon. Issues stemming from conflict, displacement, and refugees in Africa are, to a large extent, intertwined with the crisis of citizenship. Extensive study has sought to elucidate the causes of these problems, including, as we have demonstrated, factors of race, colonial inheritance, the failure of the national elite to reform states inherited from the colonial era, human rights violations, and the logic of 'sovereignty and State'. While these ideas shed some light on the causes of the problem, the substance of the matter includes the logic of 'containment and exclusion.' From this perspective, there is a dialectical relationship between civil public space and traditional space, which is based on primary affiliations, in other words a dialectical relationship between civic citizenship and ethnic citizenship, or a logic of sovereignty and the state. It is simply a manifestation of containment or the exclusion of others, a phenomenon that is very clear in the African context. For example, access to limited resources such as land and natural wealth is a motive for competition and exclusion.

It is clear that issues of race and land-related relationships have been used to legitimize particular tribal groups or delegitimize other groups to force them to settle at the margins of existing towns and villages (the most prominent example here is in the Great Lakes region). This struggle for access to and control over these resources has undoubtedly led conflicting ethnic groups to adopt harsh and violent positions. This complex migration crisis therefore cuts across many dimensions and dynamics.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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